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I. INTRODUCTION
News stories in recent years have regularly appeared where students,
staff, or faculty members at public institutions of higher education are
investigated, rebuked, or reprimanded by their college or university for
online expression. Such cases have the potential to raise First Amendment
questions. In particular, there are several instances of students being
scrutinized for their social media expression, with the content and context
of that speech varying widely.
In July 2015, the former president of Valdosta State University settled
a $900,000 lawsuit for expelling a student who posted on Facebook a
“satirical environmentalist collage” that showed pictures of the university
president and parking deck construction. 1 The student was punished after
the university president interpreted this criticism of the campus’s decision
to build additional parking structures as threatening. 2
In January 2017, Cooper Medical School of Rowan University filed a
“Professionalism Intervention Report” against a medical student after she
posted on Instagram a topless photo of herself at a nude beach in Europe

Professor of Political Science and Director of the Menard Center for Constitutional Studies,
University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire; Municipal Judge, City of Rice Lake, Wisconsin; J.D.,
University of Wisconsin Law School, 2007; Ph.D., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2007.
Adam Floyd, Former VSU Student Gets $900,000 Payment, VALDOSTA DAILY TIMES (July
25, 2015), https://www.valdostadailytimes.com/news/local_news/former-vsu-student-gets900-000-payment/article_4e77ad88-3272-11e5-94b7-e7007ee5804d.html
[https://perma.cc/HV8T-KWHL].
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that included “#freethenipple.” 3 Although the student’s nipples were
blurred to conform to Instagram policies, administrators told the student to
remove pictures from her account that a “reasonable person” would
interpret as “sexually explicit.” 4
In February 2017, a University of Central Florida student was
suspended after posting on Twitter pictures of a break-up letter from his exgirlfriend, with the student negatively “grading” the letter’s grammar in a
series of posts. 5 The student’s suspension was later overturned. 6
In November 2017, a University of North Florida student was
suspended after allegedly posting a photo of himself shirtless, with a swastika
tattoo on his chest, and holding a semi-automatic rifle. 7 The Facebook
photo was accompanied by the following statement: “[I]t is okay to be
WHITE!!!!! Let SDS and the other clowns come at me, I will shut them
down. Fuck the BLM BS!!! I am WHITE and PROUD, and these queer
balls have yet to confront me on campus.” 8
In January 2018, a University of Alabama student posted racist videos
on Instagram where she repeatedly used the N-word, including in a post
made on Martin Luther King Day. 9 The university expelled the student. 10
In March 2019, at the University of Wisconsin-Oshkosh, a photo was
shared on Snapchat by white candidates for student body president and vice
president, stating, “Vote for these guys today unless you want a lesbian or a
hmong [sic] to win.” 11 The post was widely denounced, including by
university officials, but it does not appear any sanctions were imposed
Sarah McLaughlin, Cooper Medical School of Rowan University Revises Social Media
Policy After Letter from FIRE, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RTS. IN EDUC.: NEWSDESK (Oct.
3

6, 2017), https://www.thefire.org/cooper-medical-school-of-rowan-university-revises-socialmedia-policy-after-letter-from-fire/ [https://perma.cc/H9K4-TNZB].
4

Id.

Nick Roll, A Tweet with Consequences, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (July 19, 2017),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/07/19/student-suspended-after-tweeting-aboutex-girlfriend [https://perma.cc/P7RF-VCLA].
Nick Roll, On Second Thought..., INSIDE HIGHER ED. (July 20, 2017),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/07/20/u-central-florida-reinstates-studentsuspended-over-tweet [https://perma.cc/FWN9-WR78].
Tiffany Salameh & Pierce Turner, Student and Former KKK Member Suspended After
Posting Photo with a Gun, U.N. FLA. SPINNAKER (Nov. 14, 2017),
https://unfspinnaker.com/62848/news/student-and-former-kkk-member-suspended-afterposting-photo-with-a-gun/ [https://perma.cc/2B7W-HCC2].
5

6

7

8

Id.

TRIB. MEDIA WIRE, University of Alabama Student Expelled After Racist Instagram Rants
Surface, WREG-TV (Jan. 18, 2018), https://wreg.com/news/university-of-alabama-student-

9

expelled-after-racist-instagram-rants-surface/ [https://perma.cc/C9C4-KY6G].
10

Id.

Devi Shastri, Offensive Image During UW-Oshkosh Student Elections Leads to Deeper
at Campus Climate, MILW. J. SENTINEL (Mar. 19, 2019),
https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/education/2019/03/19/racist-homophobic-snapchatsparks-frustration-anger-uw-oshkosh/3202560002/ [https://perma.cc/3VPB-E6RP].
11
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against the students who made the post. 12
In February 2020, students at the State University of New York at
Albany posted on Instagram a video of a coronavirus-themed party, where
participants wore surgical masks, drank Corona beer, and displayed a white
sheet with a biohazard symbol. 13 The university responded by characterizing
the party as distasteful, announcing that “any allegations of conduct
violations will be investigated and addressed through the university’s
disciplinary process.” 14
A U.S. Naval Academy student faced expulsion for posting multiple
tweets in June 2020, including the following tweet made during national
protests over the killing of George Floyd: “Go ahead, cut funds to the police.
Community policing by building relations is expensive and timely, anyways.
Bullets, on the other hand, are cheap and in ready supply.” 15
In December 2020, Utah State University blocked a student from its
social media accounts after the student referred to the university as
“bastards” in a tweet criticizing the campus library for not having enough
exits. 16
In February 2021, a University of Tennessee pharmacy graduate
student filed a federal lawsuit in response to a disciplinary committee’s
decision to expel her (a decision later overturned) for Twitter posts she
made using a pseudonym. 17 The university had deemed the student’s posts—
including one in which she exposed her cleavage while sticking out her
tongue and another in which she suggested lyrics for a possible remix of the
song “WAP” by Cardi B and Megan Thee Stallion—too “vulgar” and
“crude” for a pharmacy graduate student. 18
There are also ample examples of public university employees,
including faculty, who draw the ire of their campuses for social media posts.
An East Stroudsburg University sociology professor was suspended
after making multiple Facebook posts in 2010, with one in January joking,
12

Id.

Lilah Burke, Coronavirus-Themed Party at Albany Draws Criticism, INSIDE HIGHER ED.
(Feb. 24, 2020), https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2020/02/24/coronavirusthemed-party-albany-draws-criticism [https://perma.cc/5STC-FAQP].
13

14

Id.

Edward Ericson, Jr., Student Sues Naval Academy over Expulsion for Social Media Posts,
COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Sept. 30, 2020), https://www.courthousenews.com/student-suesnaval-academy-over-expulsion-for-social-media-posts/ [https://perma.cc/GB53-PPVK].
Taylor Cripe & Sydney Dahle, BLOCKED — USU’s Social Media Policies Called into
Question, UTAH STATESMAN (Jan. 25, 2021), https://usustatesman.com/blocked-usus-socialmedia-policies-called-into-question/ [https://perma.cc/B58G-6VSJ].
Anemona Hartocollis, Students Punished for “Vulgar” Social Media Posts Are Fighting
Back, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/05/us/colleges-socialmedia-discipline.html [https://perma.cc/2QUU-4CVH].
Id. In the song, “WAP” stands for “wet-ass pussy.” Charles Holmes, The Conservative
Crusade Against “Wet-Ass Pussy,” ROLLING STONE (Aug. 11, 2020),
https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-news/wet-ass-pussy-ben-shapiro-conservativebacklash-1042491/ [https://perma.cc/C9G2-LZQH].
15
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“Does anyone know where I can find a very discrete hitman? Yes, it’s been
that kind of day . . . ,” 19 and another in February facetiously claiming she
“had a good day today. DIDN’T want to kill even one student. :-). Now
Friday was a different story.” 20
In September 2013, a University of Kansas journalism professor was
put on indefinite leave after posting the following on Twitter:
“#NavyYardShooting The blood is on the hands of the #NRA. Next time,
let it be YOUR sons and daughters. Shame on you. May God damn you.” 21
In August 2017, a Montclair State University adjunct instructor in
gender, sexuality, and women’s studies was removed from two classes he
was scheduled to teach after he tweeted, “Trump is a fucking joke. this is all
a sham. i [sic] wish someone would just shoot him outright.” 22 After the
instructor was stripped of his teaching duties, the university claimed he
“ha[d] never been an employee” of the campus, although an Inside Higher
Ed investigation concluded he had been an instructor there. 23
In April 2018, a California State University, Fresno professor of
English was investigated but ultimately not disciplined after she posted
remarks on Twitter following the death of Barbara Bush, calling the former
First Lady an “amazing racist who, along with her husband, raised a war
criminal.” 24 The university president characterized the professor’s
comments as “disgraceful” and “an embarrassment to the university,” but
assessed that they were protected by the First Amendment. 25
In May 2018, a Rutgers University history professor posted comments
on Facebook in response to white gentrification in a Harlem neighborhood,
including, “OK, officially, I now hate white people,” and “I am a white
people, for God’s sake, but can we keep them —us —us out of my
neighborhood?” 26 He posted that a local restaurant was “overrun with little
Dalia Fahmy, Professor Suspended After Joke About Killing Students on Facebook, ABC
NEWS (Mar. 2, 2010), https://abcnews.go.com/Business/PersonalFinance/facebook-firingsemployees-online-vents-twitter-postings-cost/story?id=9986796
[https://perma.cc/38PEPHNQ].
19

20

Id.

Colleen Flaherty, Protected Tweet?, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Sept. 23, 2013),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2013/09/23/u-kansas-professor-suspended-after-antinra-tweet [https://perma.cc/ZR2Z-8BC8].
Scott Jaschik, Twitter Blowback: Lost Job and Lost Money, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Aug. 2,
2017), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/08/02/montclair-state-removes-coursesadjunct-whose-tweet-became-controversial [https://perma.cc/HHA8-2RLF].
21

22

23

Id.

Alene Tchekmedyian, Cal State Fresno Professor Will Keep Job After “Disgraceful”
Tweets About Barbara Bush, Campus President Says, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2018),
24

https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-fresno-professor-barbara-bush-20180424story.html [https://perma.cc/7QDR-Z8VV].
25

Id.

26

Hannan Adely, Rutgers Clears Professor Who Said He “Hates White People,” N. JERSEY
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Caucasian a-holes.” 27 Although an initial investigation by Rutgers concluded
that the professor’s posts violated the university’s discrimination and
harassment policy, the university later reversed that decision. 28
In November 2019, Indiana University publicly condemned, but took
no disciplinary action against, a professor of business economics whose
tweets were characterized by the university as “stunningly ignorant” posts
that included “racist, sexist and homophobic views.” 29 One of the professor’s
posts rhetorically asked if “Democratic women have sex with anyone,” and
another tweet was a link to an article titled, “Are Women Destroying
Academia? Probably.” 30 In defense of not disciplining the professor, the
university declared that it could not fire him “for his posts as a private citizen,
as vile and stupid as they are, because the First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution forbids us to do so.” 31 However, the university announced that
no student would be required to take a class with the professor, who also
would be required to use double-blind grading on assignments. 32
A criminal justice professor who tweeted in May 2020 about national
protests over race and policing claimed that Weber State University forced
him to resign in response. 33 In one post, reacting to a tweet from a reporter
who had been injured by police during a protest, the professor proclaimed,
“Excellent. If I was the cop, you wouldn’t be able to tweet.” 34 Upon seeing
the CNN building being vandalized, the professor tweeted, “Nothing about
this makes me happy but there’s this tiny sense of rightness in the burning
of the CNN headquarters.” 35 The university condemned the comments but
claimed no pressure was put on the professor to resign. 36
In September 2020, a Midwestern State University philosophy
professor wrote the following on Facebook: “I want the entire world to burn
until the last cop is strangled with the intestines of the last capitalist, who is

(Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.northjersey.com/story/news/2018/11/15/no-punishmentrutgers-university-professor-over-white-people-comments-facebook/2016377002/
[https://perma.cc/A7FL-U4PM].
27
28

Id.
Id.

Colleen Flaherty, Bigoted Views vs. Bigoted Teaching, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Nov. 22,
2019),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/11/22/indiana-university-condemnsprofessors-racist-and-misogynistic-tweets-strongest [https://perma.cc/XC9B-3ZA6].
29

30
31
32

Id.
Id.
Id.

Colleen Flaherty, Saying the Wrong Thing, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (June 4, 2020),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2020/06/04/professor-resigns-after-criticizingprotesters-and-another-faces-callshis?utm_content=buffercfbeb&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook&utm_campaig
n=IHEbuffer [https://perma.cc/BDR8-QHHG].
33

34
35
36

Id.
Id.
Id.
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strangled in turn with the intestines of the last politician.” 37 The university’s
president denounced the post and announced the following after conferring
with the state attorney general’s office: “We are committed to monitoring
this situation with their guidance and will take decisive action if a line is
crossed beyond that of speech protected by the First Amendment.” 38
In October 2020, while watching the vice presidential debate, a Collin
College history professor tweeted, “The moderator needs to talk over Mike
Pence until he shuts his little demon mouth up.” 39 In response, her
employer publicly apologized for the “hateful, vile and ill-considered”
statement and emailed the professor an “Employee Coaching Form” that
included “Constructive Feedback.” 40 The college prohibited the professor
from using her work email for personal communications, even though
college policy permits work email for “incidental personal use.” 41 After the
same professor criticized the Collin College COVID-19 reopening plan,
including tweeting in January 2021 how “[a]nother @collincollege professor
has died of COVID,” her contract was terminated in February 2021. 42 The
former professor filed a lawsuit against the college in October 2021, alleging
First Amendment violations. 43 Without admitting liability, in January 2022
the college agreed to pay the former professor $70,000 plus attorney’s fees. 44
In December 2020, the University of Mississippi fired a history
professor after he made a series of tweets criticizing his employer for
refusing to accept a grant for education on immigrant detention and mass
Colleen Flaherty, University Seeks State AG’s Advice on Professor’s Facebook Post,
INSIDE
HIGHER
ED.
(Oct.
5,
2020),
https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2020/10/05/university-seeks-state-ags-adviceprofessors-facebook-post [https://perma.cc/BEH7-DY63].
37

38

Id.

Simone Carter, Professor’s Tweet About Pence’s “Little Demon Mouth” Sparks Collin
Controversy,
DALLAS
OBSERVER
(Oct.
19,
2020),
https://www.dallasobserver.com/news/collin-college-professors-political-tweets-11955945
[https://perma.cc/CB96-NKER].

39

College

40
41

Id.
Id.

Michael Vasquez, Fired for Tweeting? A Professor Says She Was Cut Loose in Retaliation,
CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Feb. 25, 2021), https://www.chronicle.com/article/fired-fortweeting-a-professor-says-she-was-cut-loose-inretaliation?cid2=gen_login_refresh&cid=gen_sign_in [https://perma.cc/8YAW-2LSS].
Simone Carter, Another Former Professor Sues Collin College Over Alleged First
Amendment
Violations,
DALLAS
OBSERVER
(Oct.
27,
2021),
https://www.dallasobserver.com/news/another-professor-has-sued-collin-college-allegingfree-speech-violations-12689856 [https://perma.cc/3JQZ-KRKM].
Colleen Flaherty, Collin College Will Pay $70K to Ousted Professor Who Tweeted,
INSIDE
HIGHER
ED.
(Jan.
26,
2022),
https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2022/01/26/collin-college-will-pay-70k-oustedprofessor-whotweeted#:~:text=Collin%20College%20in%20Texas%20will,Rights%20in%20Education%20
announced%20Tuesday [https://perma.cc/RHR6-2GPM].
42

43

44

412

2022] FREE SPEECH, SOCIAL MEDIA & PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES 413

incarceration. 45 The professor tweeted, “The real issue is that (UM)
prioritizes racist donors over all else. So it’s not some mythic politics v.
history binary, but that this antiracist program threatens racist donor money.
And racism is the brand. It’s in the name.” 46
In January 2021, the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga fired an
assistant football coach after he tweeted the following about former Georgia
gubernatorial candidate Stacey Abrams, who had organized in two Georgia
senate run-off elections:
Congratulations to the state of GA and Fat Albert @staceyabrams
because you have truly shown America the true works of cheating
in an election again!!! Enjoy the buffet Big Girl! You earned it!!!
Hope the money was good, still not governor! 47
In April 2021, the coach filed a lawsuit against the university, claiming
he was fired as retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights. 48
In February 2021, a University of Alabama at Birmingham archeology
professor tweeted the following in reaction to the death of Rush Limbaugh:
“When a terrible piece of scum who caused immeasurable harm to millions
dies, there is no sympathy. Only a desire that they suffered until their last
breath.” 49 The university’s president proclaimed the campus was “disgusted
and extremely troubled” by “something so unprofessional and blindly
inhumane and cruel” and announced that the matter was under review. 50
Clearly, there have been numerous cases of public universities
punishing, criticizing, or investigating students, staff, and faculty for social
media posts in recent years. Relevant university actions were initiated against
persons expressing a variety of viewpoints across the ideological spectrum.
The number of incidents expanded during the COVID-19 pandemic,
Christian Middleton, UM Fires History Professor Who Criticizes “Powerful, Racist
And “Carceral State,” MISS. FREE PRESS (Dec. 15, 2020),
https://www.mississippifreepress.org/7518/um-fires-history-professor-who-criticizespowerful-racist-donors-and-carceral-state/ [https://perma.cc/J6BX-6PNS].

45

Donors”
46

Id.

Adam Rittenberg, Tennessee-Chattanooga Mocs Fire Assistant Football Coach Chris
Malone After Racist Tweet, ESPN (Jan. 7, 2021), https://www.espn.com/college-

47

football/story/_/id/30668106/tennessee-chattanooga-mocs-fire-assistant-football-coach-chrismalone-racist-tweet [https://perma.cc/4L7P-7SBG].
Adam Rittenberg, Former Tennessee-Chattanooga Assistant Coach Chris Malone, Fired
Over Tweet, Sues School for First Amendment Retaliation, ESPN (Apr. 28, 2021),
https://www.espn.com/college-football/story/_/id/31352564/former-tennessee-chattanoogaassistant-coach-chris-malone-fired-tweet-sues-school-first-amendment-retaliation
[https://perma.cc/L2NB-XRAP].
Ruth Serven Smith, Legal Experts: Sarah Parcak’s Tweet About Rush Limbaugh Protected
by First Amendment, AL.COM (Feb. 23, 2021), https://www.al.com/news/2021/02/legalexperts-uab-professors-tweet-about-rush-limbaugh-protected-by-first-amendment.html
[https://perma.cc/P8TZ-L2ZN].
48

49

50

Id.
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which reduced in-person interaction and increased communication on
social media. 51 COVID-19 has particularly affected institutions of higher
education, as many universities moved classes online, 52 thus allowing less
face-to-face communication among students, staff, and faculty.
Nevertheless, modern attempts by public universities to police speech are
continuations of a centuries-long struggle over what expression can and
should be permitted at institutions of higher education. 53 Were the actions
of the colleges and universities above constitutional? All of the cases above
were from public colleges and universities. 54 Although it is arguable as a
policy matter that private colleges should follow the same constitutional
standards that are required for public universities, private higher educational
institutions are not generally bound by the First Amendment. 55 Thus, this
article will focus exclusively on what the Free Speech Clause requires for
public institutions of higher education.
This article will proceed as follows. Part II discusses the background
of relevant First Amendment case law on expression on the Internet,
explaining how constitutional protections for the freedom of speech apply
to government regulation of this medium of communication generally, and
to social media specifically. 56 The next three parts examine, in turn, what the
application of First Amendment jurisprudence distinctly means for
students, staff, and faculty. Part III explores what this means specifically for
students, concluding that, generally, student expression on social media
cannot be punished by public universities if that expression is otherwise
protected for adults in public forums. 57 Part IV explains First Amendment
rights for campus staff as public employees on social media. 58 The relevant
test here is from the Pickering-Connick-Garcetti line of cases, which
requires balancing public employee speech made on matters of public
concern when speaking as citizens against employer interests in effectiveness
See Ella Koeze & Nathaniel Popper, The Virus Changed the Way We Internet, N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
7,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/04/07/technology/coronavirus-internet-use.html
[https://perma.cc/4RZF-AHCG]; Rani Molla, Posting Less, Posting More, and Tired of It
All: How the Pandemic Has Changed Social Media, VOX (Mar. 1, 2021),
https://www.vox.com/recode/22295131/social-media-use-pandemic-covid-19-instagramtiktok [https://perma.cc/223E-N33G].
Lilah Burke, Moving into the Long Term, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Oct. 27, 2020),
https://www.insidehighered.com/digital-learning/article/2020/10/27/long-term-onlinelearning-pandemic-may-impact-students-well [https://perma.cc/P8XD-F4GT].
See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY & HOWARD GILLMAN, FREE SPEECH ON CAMPUS 49–81 (2017).
Hereafter, this article will frequently refer to “public universities,” but those remarks will
generally apply to any public institutions of higher education, including public four-year
colleges, community colleges, and technical colleges.
CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 53, at 8.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
51

52

53
54

55
56
57
58
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and efficiency. As will be argued below, the First Amendment mandates that
what it means to be speaking on matters of public concern should be
interpreted broadly, while official job duties and employer interests should
be interpreted narrowly. Part V focuses on the special considerations for
faculty and academic freedom at public universities, finding that the official
work duty requirement from Garcetti should not be applied to faculty. 59
Finally, Part VI will conclude how these First Amendment protections
ensure that members of each of these three groups can freely use social
media to organize and express themselves, regardless of the viewpoints they
are expressing. 60
All told, outside of a small number of narrowly defined exceptions,
speech by students, staff, and faculty is protected against reprisal by public
universities. In each of the examples above, the speech was at least partially—
if not fully—protected by the First Amendment (although some of the
speech uttered by students might not have been protected if it had been said
by faculty or staff). Public universities can achieve essential societal values of
equality, diversity, and inclusivity and promote civility in discourse while also
respecting the dictates of the First Amendment. Universities have
tremendous institutional academic freedom to set curricula, build
programming, engage in out-of-class educational opportunities, and
determine whom they will hire and admit. Public universities need to
promote essential societal values in ways that guarantee they are not
engaging in viewpoint discrimination or compelling expression of
ideological beliefs, ensuring these institutions are held accountable
constitutionally and do not impose punishments that fall disproportionately
on groups that have been traditionally, and continue to be, marginalized.
II. THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH ONLINE
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution commands that
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” 61 For
nearly a century, the U.S. Supreme Court has incorporated this right to
apply it to the states. 62 Thus, the First Amendment is relevant to both federal
and state regulations on the Internet as well as state and federal regulations
of public universities. 63
The Court has held for decades that the First Amendment provides

59
60

See infra Part V.
See infra Part VI.

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (“[W]e may and do assume that freedom
of speech and of the press—which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment
by Congress—are among the fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States”).
See infra Parts III–V for extended discussion of the First Amendment’s applicability to
state institutions of higher education.
61
62

63
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strong protection for online speech. 64 Historically, when a new medium of
communication has arisen, the Court has evaluated the First Amendment’s
applicability to it, 65 as “[e]ach medium of expression . . . must be assessed
for First Amendment purposes by standards suited to it, for each may
present its own problems.” 66 This protection has sometimes grown over
time. For instance, after initially finding no First Amendment safeguard for
films in 1915, 67 the Court eventually concluded in Joseph Burstyn v. Wilson
(1952) that “expression by means of motion pictures is included within the
free speech and free press guaranty of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.” 68
For broadcast radio and television, the Court upheld federal regulatory
licensing in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC (1969): 69
Because of the scarcity of radio frequencies, the Government is
permitted to put restraints on licensees in favor of others whose
views should be expressed on this unique medium . . . It is the
purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited
marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather
than to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it
be by the Government itself or a private licensee. 70
In addition to bandwidth scarcity, the Court reasoned in Red Lion that
more rule-making power existed for this medium because of the long history
of government regulation. 71 The Court later found in FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation (1978) that more regulation was warranted for broadcast media
because of its “uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans,” 72
in that it “confronts the citizen, not only in public, but also in the privacy of
the home.” 73 However, the Court later went on to conclude that “the special
interest of the federal government in regulation of the broadcast media does
not readily translate into a justification for regulation of other means of
communication.” 74 Thus, unlike its decision in Pacifica to permit higher
levels of regulation of broadcast media, the Court offered more protection

Marvin Ammori, First Amendment Architecture, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 1, 43 (2012).
Mark Tushnet, Internet Exceptionalism: An Overview from General Constitutional Law,
56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1637, 1640 (2015).
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975).
Mut. Film Corp. v. Indus. Com. of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230, 247 (1915).
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952).
64
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Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 400–01 (1969).
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Id. at 390.
Id. at 375.
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FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978).
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Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74 (1983).
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for dial-a-porn services in Sable Communications v. FCC (1989). 75 In Sable,
the Court reasoned that “[u]nlike an unexpected outburst on a radio
broadcast, the message received by one who places a call to a dial-a-porn
service is not so invasive or surprising that it prevents an unwilling listener
from avoiding exposure to it.” 76
The principal case for speech protections on the Internet is Reno v.
ACLU (1997). 77 The case reviewed the constitutionality of the
Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), a law that prohibited “the knowing
transmission of obscene or indecent messages to any recipient under 18
years of age” and “the knowing sending or displaying of patently offensive
messages in a manner that is available to a person under 18 years of age.” 78
In overturning this law, 79 the Court declined to apply a lower level of scrutiny
to government regulation of speech online like it had for broadcast radio
and television. 80 The Court recalled in Reno that “some of our cases have
recognized special justifications for regulation of the broadcast media that
are not applicable to other speakers,” including “the history of extensive
Government regulation of the broadcast medium; the scarcity of available
frequencies at its inception; and its ‘invasive’ nature.” 81 However, the Court
went on to proclaim that
Those factors are not present in cyberspace. Neither before nor
after the enactment of the CDA have the vast democratic forums
of the Internet been subject to the type of government supervision
and regulation that has attended the broadcast industry.
Moreover, the Internet is not as “invasive” as radio or television.
. . . “[C]ommunications over the Internet do not ‘invade’ an
individual’s home or appear on one’s computer screen unbidden.
Users seldom encounter content ‘by accident.’” 82
Additionally, the Court explained that there are no scarcity concerns
with the Internet as there were when Congress began regulating broadcast
media:
Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
Id. at 128.
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
Id. at 859.
Id. at 882.
Christopher S. Yoo, The Rise and Demise of the Technology-Specific Approach to the
First Amendment, 91 GEO. L.J. 245, 270 (2003).
Reno, 521 U.S. at 868 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 868–69 (internal citations omitted) (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 844
(E.D. Pa. 1996)). Some have questioned the characterization of the Internet as not invasive.
See, e.g., Julian Baumrin, Internet Hate Speech and the First Amendment, Revisited, 37
RUTGERS COMPUT. & TECH. L.J. 223, 258–62 (2011). Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme Court
has not indicated in its contemporary First Amendment jurisprudence that it views the
Internet as more invasive today.
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This dynamic, multifaceted category of communication includes
not only traditional print and news services, but also audio, video,
and still images, as well as interactive, real-time dialogue. Through
the use of chat rooms, any person with a phone line can become
a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from
any soapbox. Through the use of Web pages, mail exploders, and
newsgroups, the same individual can become a pamphleteer. 83
These analogies compare the Internet to forms of pure speech (made
in person or reproduced by audio, visual, or pictorial means) or printed
expression, providing the government with less power to regulate expression
online than broadcast speech. 84
The Court described the Internet positively throughout the Reno
decision, including characterizing it as “a vast platform from which to
address and hear from a worldwide audience of millions of readers, viewers,
researchers, and buyers.” 85 The Court underscored the importance of the
Internet for the freedom of expression: “Any person or organization with a
computer connected to the Internet can ‘publish’ information.” 86 For these
reasons, the Court concluded that “our cases provide no basis for qualifying
the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to this
medium.” 87
After Reno, the Court has applied the First Amendment to the Internet
with continued vigor. In Ashcroft v. ACLU (2004), the Court upheld an
injunction against the enforcement of the Child Online Protection Act
(“COPA”), a law passed by Congress in response to the Court’s decision
striking down the CDA in Reno. 88 COPA “impose[d] criminal penalties of
a $50,000 fine and six months in prison for the knowing posting, for
‘commercial purposes,’ of World Wide Web content that is ‘harmful to
minors.’” 89 Since COPA was a content-based restriction on expression, the
Court applied strict scrutiny: “Content-based prohibitions, enforced by
severe criminal penalties, have the constant potential to be a repressive force
in the lives and thoughts of a free people. To guard against that threat, the
Constitution demands that content-based restrictions on speech be
presumed invalid . . . .” 90 The Court found that COPA was not the least
Reno, 521 U.S. at 870.
Maureen E. Browne, Play It Again Uncle Sam: Another Attempt by Congress to Regulate
Internet Content. How Will They Fare This Time?, 12 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 79, 84
83
84

(2004).
Reno, 521 U.S. at 853.
85
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87

Id.
Id. at 870.
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Ashcroft v. ACLU (Ashcroft II), 542 U.S. 656, 660–61 (2004).
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Id. at 661.
Id. at 660.
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restrictive way to protect children from pornographic material online, as
“[b]locking and filtering software is an alternative that is less restrictive than
COPA, and, in addition, likely more effective as a means of restricting
children’s access to materials harmful to them.” 91 The Court affirmed its
approach from Reno to give a strong level of protection to speech online,
interpreting the First Amendment to safeguard a free market of ideas on the
Internet. 92
Similarly, in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition (2002), the Court
struck down a portion of the Child Pornography Prevention Act (“CPPA”). 93
The CPPA amended the federal ban on child pornography to include the
possession or distribution of sexually explicit images that appear to depict
minors but were produced without using real children. 94 Such images
include those of adults who look like children or those created using
computer imaging. 95 Although the law applied to images distributed through
means other than the Internet, the CPPA had significant implications for
online expression. 96 The Court found the law to be overbroad, running the
risk of “chill[ing] speech within the First Amendment’s vast and privileged
sphere,” because “[a]s a general rule, pornography can be banned only if
obscene” according to the test in Miller v. California (1973). 97 Miller strictly
limits what constitutes obscenity, requiring all of the following to be true for
expression to be outside of First Amendment protection:
(a) . . . “the average person, applying contemporary community
standards” would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to
the prurient interest; (b) . . . the work depicts or describes, in a
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law; and (c) . . . the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. 98

New York v. Ferber (1982) created an exception to that general rule,
permitting the government to criminalize child pornography if “the images
are themselves the product of child sexual abuse,” because the government
has “an interest in stamping it out without regard to any judgment about its

91

Id. at 666–67.

Mark S. Kende, Filtering Out Children: The First Amendment and Internet Porn in the
U.S. Supreme Court, 3 MICH. ST. L. REV. 843, 844 (2005).
92

93

Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 258 (2002).

Id. at 239.
Id. at 239–40.
See generally Maria Markova, Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition: The Constitutionality of
Congressional Efforts to Ban Computer-Generated Pornography, 24 WHITTIER L. REV.

94
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985, 985–86 (2003) (noting that the CPPA prohibited “knowing transportation (by any
means, including computer)” of the images subject to regulation).
Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 240, 244.
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (internal citations omitted).
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content.” 99 However, since the CPPA banned non-obscene “speech that
records no crime and creates no victims by its production,” the Court ruled
the law was unconstitutional. 100 Put more succinctly, the Court explained that
its “First Amendment cases draw vital distinctions between words and
deeds, between ideas and conduct.” 101 Thus, the Court in Free Speech
Coalition continued to apply traditional First Amendment standards to
speech online in the same way it had been applied to expression in other
non-broadcasting formats. 102
This approach continued in Packingham v. North Carolina (2017). 103
In that case, the Court reviewed a state law making it a felony for a registered
sex offender “to access a commercial social networking Web site where the
sex offender knows that the site permits minor children to become
members or to create or maintain personal Web pages.” 104 Lester
Packingham was convicted in 2002 of “taking indecent liberties with a
child,” which required him to register as a sex offender, meaning that the
relevant statute barred him from accessing social media. 105 In 2010, after a
court dismissed a traffic citation against Packingham, he posted on
Facebook to express his happiness at the decision. 106 A law enforcement
officer discovered the post, leading to Packingham’s conviction for violating
the law, even though prosecutors never alleged that he contacted a minor or
engaged in any other illicit activity online. 107 Although the Court assumed
that the law was content-neutral—requiring the law to pass intermediate
scrutiny—the Court held that the statute was not narrowly tailored because it
restricted a significant amount of online speech. 108
According to the Court in Packingham, a “fundamental principle of
the First Amendment is that all persons have access to places where they
can speak and listen, and then, after reflection, speak and listen once
more.” 109 Although historically this meant traditional public forums like
parks and sidewalks, 110 the Court proclaimed that the most vital place for
Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 249.
Id. at 250.
Id. at 253.
Ryan P. Kennedy, Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition: Can We Roast the Pig Without
Burning Down the House in Regulating “Virtual” Child Pornography?, 37 AKRON L. REV.

99

100
101
102

379, 397–400 (2004).
Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017).
Id. at 1733 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§14-202.5(a), (e) (West 2015)).
Id. at 1734.
Id. Packingham’s statement on Facebook was as follows: “Man God is Good! How about
I got so much favor they dismissed the ticket before court even started? No fine, no court
cost, no nothing spent...... Praise be to GOD, WOW! Thanks JESUS!” Id.
103
104
105
106

107
108
109
110

Id.
Id. at 1736–37.
Id. at 1735.
See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (“[S]treets and parks . . .
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expression today is online: “While in the past there may have been difficulty
in identifying the most important places (in a spatial sense) for the exchange
of views, today the answer is clear. It is cyberspace—the ‘vast democratic
forums of the Internet’ in general, and social media in particular.” 111 This
powerful statement about the need to protect expression online was
followed by the Court noting that approximately seventy percent of
American adults use social media. 112 The Court reasoned that it “must
exercise extreme caution before suggesting that the First Amendment
provides scant protection for access to vast networks in that medium,” since
“[s]ocial media allows users to gain access to information and communicate
with one another about it on any subject that might come to mind.” 113 The
Court found constitutional fault with a law that “with one broad stroke bars
access to what for many are the principal sources for knowing current
events, checking ads for employment, speaking and listening in the modern
public square, and otherwise exploring the vast realms of human thought
and knowledge.” 114 The Justices in Packingham ruled that social media
receives as much First Amendment protection as the Court in Reno found
for the Internet generally. 115
Expression on social media is shielded by the First Amendment to the
same high degree as spoken word and traditional print media, and
government restrictions on online speech are not judged by the more lenient
approaches used for broadcast media regulations. 116 Even more to the point,
many of the restrictions on Internet speech that the Court has struck down
for not being narrowly tailored have dealt with the vital government
functions of protecting children from abuse or exposure to sexually explicit
materials. 117 Thus, there are no additional regulatory powers over this
medium that would be relevant to restricting expression rights beyond what
public universities may impose generally for members of the campus
community. Unlike campus radio or television stations, which are subject to
Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) licensing and regulations, 118
have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have
been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and
discussing public questions.”).
Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1735 (internal citation omitted).
111
112
113
114

Id.
Id. at 1736–37.
Id. at 1737.

Katherine A. Ferry, Reviewing the Impact of the Supreme Court’s Interpretation of “Social
Media” as Applied to Off-Campus Student Speech, 49 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 717, 742 (2018).
Rebecca Jakubcin, Reno v. ACLU: Establishing a First Amendment Level of Protection
for the Internet, 9 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 287, 292–93 (1998).
Mason C. Shefa, First Amendment 2.0: Revisiting Marsh and the Quasi-Public Forum in
the Age of Social Media, 41 U. HAW. L. REV. 159, 177–80 (2018).
See
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Public
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(Sept.
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expression online by members of the university community cannot be
regulated to a greater degree simply because it is online. As Parts III–V
demonstrate, there are three different categories of persons at issue
regarding social media expression at public universities: students, noninstructional staff, and teaching faculty. Consequently, there are three sets
of different, but at times overlapping, considerations for what the First
Amendment protects for these three groups on social media.
III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF PUBLIC UNIVERSITY
STUDENTS ON SOCIAL MEDIA
The Court has specifically outlined the First Amendment rights of
public university students only within the last fifty years. 119 Earlier Court
decisions on public students’ First Amendment rights focused on K–12
students. For instance, in West Virginia v. Barnette (1943), the Court ruled
unconstitutional the expulsion of a student who refused to recite the Pledge
of Allegiance and salute the U.S. flag. 120 In doing so, the Court found that
the First Amendment prohibited compelled speech, proclaiming, “[t]hat
[public schools] are educating the young for citizenship is reason for
scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are
not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount
important principles of our government as mere platitudes.” 121 Similarly,
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District (1969)
overturned the suspension of public school students wearing black
armbands with peace symbols in protest of the Vietnam War. 122 According
to the Court, “[i]t can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate.” 123 Although the case dealt with students in K–12 public
schools, one could easily apply the Court’s reasoning to the rights of adult
students at public universities. 124
Any doubt about this proposition was removed in Healy v. James
(1972). 125 In Healy, the Central Connecticut State College had denied
official organization recognition to a campus chapter of Students for a
Democratic Society (“SDS”). 126 Due to concerns about the national SDS’s
“reputation for campus disruption,” the college president stated that the
college would not officially recognize an organization that “openly
See Eric T. Kasper, Public Universities and the First Amendment: Controversial Speakers,
Protests, and Free Speech Policies, 47 CAP. U. L. REV. 529, 535–37 (2019).
119
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W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
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Id. at 634, 637.
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Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
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Id. at 506.
Kasper, supra note 119, at 534.
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repudiates” the college’s commitment to academic freedom. 127 However, the
Court overturned this decision, quoting the line above from Tinker while
declaring that “state colleges and universities are not enclaves immune from
the sweep of the First Amendment.” 128 Accordingly, the Court held that “the
precedents of this Court leave no room for the view that, because of the
acknowledged need for order, First Amendment protections should apply
with less force on college campuses than in the community at large.” 129 The
Court ruled that the freedom of expression needs to be particularly secured
at public universities: “The college classroom with its surrounding environs
is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas,’ and we break no new constitutional
ground in reaffirming this Nation’s dedication to safeguarding academic
freedom.” 130
The following year, Papish v. Board of Curators of University of
Missouri (1973), a case dealing with the expulsion of a journalism graduate
student for engaging in what the university characterized as “indecent
speech,” tested the Constitution’s protection of public university students’
free expression rights. 131 Papish’s expulsion was based on his on-campus
distribution of a student newspaper that contained two relevant items. 132
First, the front cover of the newspaper displayed a political cartoon
portraying police officers sexually assaulting the State of Liberty and the
Goddess of Justice, with the caption reading, “With Liberty and Justice for
All.” 133 Second, the newspaper included an article titled “Motherfucker
Acquitted” that discussed the assault trial and acquittal of a defendant who
was a member of an organization called “Up Against the Wall,
Motherfucker.” 134 In overturning the expulsion, the Court held that “the
mere dissemination of ideas—no matter how offensive to good taste—on a
state university campus may not be shut off in the name alone of
‘conventions of decency.” 135 The Court declared in Papish that “the First
Amendment leaves no room for the operation of a dual standard in the
academic community with respect to the content of speech.” 136
In these early cases, the Court’s decisions reflect the view that public
university students possess the same First Amendment rights as adults
generally. 137 This interpretation was confirmed in later cases. For instance,
in Widmar v. Vincent (1981), the Court overturned a University of Missouri
127
128
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130
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Id. at 180.
Id. at 180–81.
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at Kansas City ban on religious student groups using university facilities that
were available to other student organizations on free speech grounds. 138 As
explained by the Court, “an open forum in a public university does not
confer any imprimatur of state approval on religious sects or practices” if
“the forum is available to a broad class of nonreligious as well as religious
speakers.” 139 Per the Court, this content-based restriction on student
expression was subject to strict scrutiny, requiring the university to “show
that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it
is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.” 140 The Court followed a similar
approach in Rosenberger v. University of Virginia (1995), holding that if a
public university funds student organizations, it cannot deny funding to a
publication based on views expressed in the publication. 141 The Court
reasoned that, at public universities, “[i]t is axiomatic that the government
may not regulate speech based on its substantive content or the message it
conveys,” particularly “[i]n the realm of private speech or expression.” 142 A
public university’s obligation to be viewpoint neutral, regarding student
speech outside of the classroom, was affirmed in Board of Regents v.
Southworth (2000). 143 Some decisions for students in K–12 public schools
show that the Court has found exceptions to First Amendment protections
beyond what the Court articulated in Tinker, 144 which will be explored
below. However, no subsequent Supreme Court cases have weakened the
protection of free expression rights for public university students. 145
Furthermore, reducing protections for public university students on social
media platforms would create incomprehensible difficulties for First
Amendment jurisprudence.
When discussing the free expression rights of students at public
universities, it is important to distinguish between regulations that are
138

Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981).
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Id. at 274.
Id. at 270.
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Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 845–46 (1995).
Id. at 828. It is noteworthy that the Court in Rosenberger did affirm that when creating a
limited public forum, a public university may need to restrict content (assuming that strict
scrutiny is met), but it may not discriminate based on viewpoint: “Thus, in determining
whether the State is acting to preserve the limits of the forum it has created so that the
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that limited forum, and, on the other hand, viewpoint discrimination, which is presumed
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829–30. However, for present purposes, this would apply only if a university acted against a
student for posting a comment on the university’s social media account.
Bd. of Regents Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 221 (2000).
See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); see also Hazelwood Sch.
Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); see also Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
See Papandrea, supra note 137, at 1834 (“Despite the deep chasm between the liberal and
conservative Justices in [Christian Legal Society v.] Martinez, all of them agreed that the right
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permissible in different contexts. Although there is limited purview for the
government to regulate student expression in the classroom and on
campus, 146 the rights of university students on campus are more extensive
than they are for students in K–12 public schools. Granted, the applicable
standard for public universities is the same that Tinker applied to K–12
public schools. The Tinker Court ruled that schools may not restrict student
speech unless those expressive “activities would materially and substantially
disrupt the work and discipline of the school.” 147 Healy explained regarding
public universities, “[i]n the context of the ‘special characteristics of the
school environment,’ the power of the government to prohibit ‘lawless
action’ is not limited to acts of a criminal nature. Also prohibitable are
actions which ‘materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline
of the school.’” 148 As the Court further clarified in Healy, activities involving
First Amendment rights “need not be tolerated where they infringe
reasonable campus rules, interrupt classes, or substantially interfere with the
opportunity of other students to obtain an education.” 149
This having been said, there are two important considerations
regarding the application of the material and substantial disruptive standard
to students at public universities. First, even if this standard should be
applied to public university student expression on social media, what
constitutes a material and substantial disruption is understood by the Court
differently in higher education schools than in K-12 public schools. 150
Comparing several K–12 public school cases after Tinker to the Court’s
higher education cases proves this.
In Bethel School District v. Fraser (1986), the Court upheld the
suspension of a high school student who used sexual innuendo to describe
a fellow classmate campaigning for a student government office. 151 The
student said at a school assembly, “I know a man who is firm—he’s firm in
his pants, he’s firm in his shirt, his character is firm . . . Jeff Kuhlman is a
man who takes his point and pounds it in . . . Jeff is a man who will go to
the very end—even the climax, for each and every one of you.” 152 The Court
ruled that “[t]he First Amendment does not prevent the school officials
from determining that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech . . . would
undermine the school’s basic educational mission” because “freedom to
advocate unpopular and controversial views in schools and classrooms must
be balanced against the society’s countervailing interest in teaching students
the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior.” 153 The Court, though,
146
147
148
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emphasized in Bethel how “the constitutional rights of students in public
school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other
settings.” 154
Similarly, in Hazelwood School District v. Kulhmeier (1988), the
Court upheld a principal’s decision to remove stories about divorce and
teen pregnancy from the school’s newspaper. 155 The Court explained that
such editorial control over press content (which could never be sustained if
the government tried to similarly prohibit truthful media stories created by
adults on matters of public concern 156) was constitutional in the K–12 setting,
even in the absence of a finding of material and substantial disruption. 157 The
Court found that a public school has editorial control over student
newspaper content because it ensures “that readers or listeners are not
exposed to material that may be inappropriate for their level of maturity,
and that the views of the individual speaker are not erroneously attributed
to the school.” 158 Put another way by the Hazelwood Court, a K–12 public
school is permitted to “disassociate itself . . . from speech that is, for
example, ungrammatical, poorly written, inadequately researched, biased or
prejudiced, vulgar or profane, or unsuitable for immature audiences.” 159
In Morse v. Frederick (2007), the Court ruled that a public school
could constitutionally suspend a student who unfurled, and refused to take
down, a banner reading “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” at a school-sponsored
event. 160 The Court in Morse created another exception to the general rule
in Tinker by finding it constitutional for a public to impose greater
restrictions on expression advocating illegal drug use. 161 According to the
Court, prior cases “recognize that deterring drug use by schoolchildren is
an ‘important—indeed, perhaps compelling’ interest.” 162
The expression that the Court ruled K–12 school officials could
restrict in these cases—using sexual innuendos, writing newspaper stories
about divorce and teenage pregnancy, and advocating illegal drug use—pale
in comparison to what the Court has judged as protected expression at
public universities. As described in Healy, when the SDS chapter was
denied official recognition at Central Connecticut State College (1969–70),
154
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Wood, supra note 157, at 116.
Morse, 551 US. at 407 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661
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institutions of higher education were in a state of upheaval, and the SDS was
a group that was driving some of that turmoil:
A climate of unrest prevailed on many college campuses in this
country. There had been widespread civil disobedience on some
campuses, accompanied by the seizure of buildings, vandalism,
and arson. Some colleges had been shut down altogether, while
at others files were looted and manuscripts destroyed. SDS
chapters on some of those campuses had been a catalytic force
during this period. 163
Furthermore, when the students applying for official recognition were
questioned about the SDS’s “reputation for campus disruption,” they
responded in ways suggesting they could become disorderly. 164 Consider
these questions to the SDS applicants and their answers:
Q. How would you respond to issues of violence as other S.D.S.
chapters have?
A. Our action would have to be dependent upon each issue.
Q. Would you use any means possible?
A. No I can’t say that; would not know until we know what the
issues are.
Q. Could you envision the S.D.S. interrupting a class?
A. Impossible for me to say. 165
Nevertheless, the Court in Healy reversed the lower court decision that
had upheld the college’s denial of organizational approval. 166 In doing so,
the Court affirmed in Healy that “[t]hough we deplore the tendency of some
to abuse the very constitutional privileges they invoke, and although the
infringement of rights of others certainly should not be tolerated, we
reaffirm this Court’s dedication to the principles of the Bill of Rights upon
which our vigorous and free society is founded.” 167
Similarly, Papish involved expression that would clearly be punishable
if it were uttered by a student on the grounds of a K–12 public school, as it
entailed a student disseminating copies of a publication using profanity and
illustrating a sexual assault in a political cartoon. 168 The Court could use the
material and substantial disruption standard in Healy and Papish to reach
conclusions that were very different from Bethel, Hazelwood, and Morse
because there are significant differences between high school and university
163

Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 171 (1972).

164

Id. at 172–73.
Id. at 173 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 194.
Id.

165
166
167
168

Papish v. Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo., 410 U.S. 667, 670–71 (1973).
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students that demonstrate why the exceptions in those K–12 cases cannot
apply to higher education. Although almost all students in K–12 public
schools are minors under the age of eighteen, almost all public university
students are adults with greater emotional maturity. 169 While compulsory
attendance laws require K–12 students to attend school, 170 university
students are under no such legal requirements. Although high school
students generally go home at the end of the school day, a substantial
number of university students live on campus, thus potentially subjecting
them to any university speech restrictions 24-7. 171 Finally, what constitutes a
material and substantial disruption of university education is different from
a high school education because these institutions have different missions:
universities have an underlying purpose of encouraging inquiry into all
subjects and challenging assumptions in all fields, while K–12 schools are
primarily designed to inculcate values. 172 As illuminated in Papish, “the mere
dissemination of ideas—no matter how offensive to good taste,” is protected
on public university campuses if they fail to create a material and substantial
disruption. 173
Second, and more importantly, there is no reason to believe that
student speech on social media can constitute a material and substantial
disruption on campus, short of expression that is unprotected for adults
generally (categories of unprotected speech are discussed below). Since
university students are typically adults, and universities are designed as adult
institutions, university students need to be subjected to rules that apply to
adults. 174 Although some types of offensive expression online could more
easily infuriate or disturb a juvenile, adults are expected to behave rationally
and be more likely to respond appropriately. 175 Furthermore, the speech that
See McCauley v. Univ. of the V.I., 618 F.3d 232, 246–47 (3d Cir. 2010).
See Compulsory School Attendance Laws, Minimum and Maximum Age Limits for
Required Free Education, by State: 2017, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT. (2017),
169
170

https://nces.ed.gov/programs/statereform/tab5_1.asp [https://perma.cc/89TJ-Q3H9].
McCauley, 618 F.3d at 247 (“[U]niversity students, unlike public elementary and high
school students, often reside in dormitories on campus, so they remain subject to university
rules at almost all hours of the day.”).
Id. at 243.
Papish, 410 U.S. at 670. The Court concluded in Papish that there was an “absence of any
disruption of campus order or interference with the rights of others.” Id. at 670 n.6.
Meggen Lindsay, Tinker Goes to College: Why High School Free-Speech Standards
Should Not Apply to Post-Secondary Students—Tatro v. University of Minnesota, 38 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1470, 1482–83 (2012).
See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (“[A]s any parent knows and as the
scientific and sociological studies . . . tend to confirm, a lack of maturity and an
underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults and are
more understandable among the young.”) (internal quotations omitted). See also Harper v.
Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1183 (9th Cir. 2006) (“As young students acquire
more strength and maturity, and specifically as they reach college age, they become
adequately equipped emotionally and intellectually to deal with the type of verbal assaults
that may be prohibited during their earlier years.”).
171
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students post on social media might be done when students are off campus
or in the privacy of a dorm room on campus. This is situationally different
from Tinker (wearing an armband in class and between classes in school
hallways), 176 Bethel (speaking to a schoolwide assembly), 177 Hazelwood
(writing for the school newspaper as part of a class), 178 and Morse (engaging
in expression at a school-sanctioned and school-supervised event). 179
If other students on campus happen to see social media posts, they
cannot “bring” those posts into the classroom or on campus generally to
make it punishable as a material and substantial disruption if the First
Amendment otherwise protects that speech. If it were, anything a student
posts every day they are enrolled at a university (or even before they enroll),
regardless of where they post it, would be subject to university discipline,
meaning that a student would have forfeited their freedom of expression
rights as an adult until graduation. 180 Furthermore, it would imply that
students could be punished for offensive expression contained in letters,
journals/diaries, student-generated newspapers, or any verbal expressions
that students use if another member of the campus community sees or hears
it, even if those observations occur off campus. Such an approach would be
untenable for adults, even for offensive expression.
Instructive here is the Court’s recent decision at the K–12 level in
Mahanoy Area School District v. B.L. (2021). 181 Mahanoy involved a public
high school that suspended a fourteen-year-old cheerleader from the cheer
team for one year for posting on Snapchat a picture of herself and a friend
with their middle fingers raised and the accompanying caption: “Fuck
school fuck softball fuck cheer fuck everything.” 182 In overturning this
suspension, the Mahanoy Court emphasized how “from the student
speaker’s perspective, regulations of off-campus speech, when coupled with
regulations of on-campus speech, include all the speech a student utters
during the full 24-hour day. That means courts must be more skeptical of a
school’s efforts to regulate off-campus speech, for doing so may mean the
student cannot engage in that kind of speech at all.” 183 If such First
Amendment protections apply to a minor student’s online speech in
relation to a public high school, they are even stronger for an adult student’s
expression online in relation to a public university. More to the point, as
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969).
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 677–78 (1986).
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 262 (1988).
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396 (2007).
See McCauley v. Univ. of the V.I., 618 F.3d 232, 247 (3d Cir. 2010) (“The concept of the
‘schoolhouse gate,’ and the idea that students may lose some aspects of their First
Amendment right to freedom of speech while in school, does not translate well to an
environment where the student is constantly within the confines of the schoolhouse.”)
(internal citations omitted).
Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L., 141 S. Ct. 2038 (2021).
Id. at 2043.
Id. at 2046.
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explained in Mahanoy, public high schools, as “the nurseries of
democracy,” have “an interest in protecting a student’s unpopular
expression, especially when the expression takes place off campus.” 184 Since
public universities have an important societal role in fostering inquiry and
challenging existing ideas, they have an even greater interest in protecting
unpopular expression (which would certainly include offensive speech)
uttered by adult students. 185
Papish and Healy are just two in a long line of Court cases affirming
that adults generally have the right to engage in offensive expression in
public forums, prohibiting the government from engaging in content or
viewpoint discrimination when regulating that expression. 186 Perhaps the
most foundational case regarding offensive expression is Cohen v.
California (1971), where the Justices overturned a thirty-day jail sentence for
wearing a jacket with the words “Fuck the Draft” written on it while Cohen
was walking the corridors of the Los Angeles County Courthouse. 187 As
explained by the Court, “the mere presumed presence of unwitting listeners
or viewers does not serve automatically to justify curtailing all speech capable
of giving offense.” 188 This is true because “we are often ‘captives’ outside the
sanctuary of the home and subject to objectionable speech” unless there is
a “showing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an
essentially intolerable manner.” 189 Applying this reasoning to social media,
as long as a user can unfriend or block someone, it would prevent them
from seeing unwanted, offensive comments posted by a student online. 190
The First Amendment prohibits the government from determining that
certain expression may be banned simply because it is offensive to some.
As explained by the Court in Cohen, in a large, diverse, pluralistic society,
“the State has no right to cleanse public debate to the point where it is
grammatically palatable to the most squeamish among us” because “one
man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric.” 191 Even punishing just the most particularly
offensive words would be unconstitutional:
Id.
McCauley, 618 F.3d at 243.
See Clay Calvert, Iancu v. Brunetti’s Impact on First Amendment Law: Viewpoint
Discrimination, Modes of Offensive Expression, Proportionality and Profanity, 43 COLUM.
184
185
186

J.L. & ARTS 37, 42–49 (2019).
See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16–17 (1971).
Id. at 21.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
Blocking or unfriending someone on social media is relatively easy to do. For instance, a
2020 poll by the University of South Florida found that during a three-month period, over
half of Facebook users in Florida unfriended, unfollowed, or snoozed someone due to the
politics of their posts. Christine Stapleton, Survey: Over Half Floridians on Facebook Have
Unfriended, Unfollowed or Blocked Someone over Politics, PALM BEACH POST (Oct. 27,
2020), https://www.palmbeachpost.com/story/news/2020/10/27/survey-political-posts-leadunfriending-blocking-facebook/3746255001/ [https://perma.cc/9S2Z-S2F6].
Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25.
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188
189
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[M]uch linguistic expression serves a dual communicative
function: it conveys not only ideas capable of relatively precise,
detached explication, but otherwise inexpressible emotions as
well. In fact, words are often chosen as much for their emotive as
their cognitive force. We cannot sanction the view that the
Constitution, while solicitous of the cognitive content of
individual speech, has little or no regard for that emotive function
which, practically speaking, may often be the more important
element of the overall message sought to be communicated. 192
The Court reasoned in Cohen that “we cannot indulge the facile
assumption that one can forbid particular words without also running a
substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process. Indeed, governments
might soon seize upon the censorship of particular words as a convenient
guise for banning the expression of unpopular views.” 193 This reasoning can
easily be applied to online expression. What constitutes offensive
expression may vary widely in a diverse university community made up of
thousands or tens of thousands of persons, 194 so punishing students for what
is deemed offensive expression on social media may either be targeting a
way of communicating (e.g., using emotion), or it may be attempting to
banish certain ideas altogether.
The Court has reaffirmed numerous times that the First Amendment
protects the expression of what some find offensive. In Texas v. Johnson
(1989), the Court struck down a law prohibiting flag desecration,
proclaiming the following: “If there is a bedrock principle underlying the
First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression
of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable.” 195 In R.A.V. v. St. Paul (1992), the Court invalidated a biasmotivated ordinance that banned the display of “a symbol, object,
appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a
burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds
to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race,
color, creed, religion or gender.” 196 The Court in R.A.V. explained that the
“First Amendment generally prevents government from proscribing speech,
or even expressive conduct, because of disapproval of the ideas expressed.

Id. at 26.
Id.
See Grant Suneson, Looking for an Inclusive Student Body?: These Colleges Are Among
the
Most
Diverse,
USA
TODAY
(Feb.
13,
2020),

192
193
194

https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2020/02/13/these-colleges-have-the-most-diversestudent-bodies/41152233/ [https://perma.cc/4LZL-Q3LZ].
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 380, 381 (1992) (quoting ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS.
CODE § 292.02 (1990)).
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Content-based regulations are presumptively invalid.” 197 In Snyder v. Phelps
(2011), the Court overturned a civil suit for intentional infliction of
emotional distress against the Westboro Baptist Church for picketing a
military funeral with signs stating anti-LGBTQ slurs and anti-Catholic
rhetoric. 198 Silencing this hateful speech through civil suit is unconstitutional,
as speech “at a public place on a matter of public concern . . . is entitled to
‘special protection’ under the First Amendment. Such speech cannot be
restricted simply because it is upsetting or arouses contempt.” 199 The Court
held this interpretation of the First Amendment in Snyder because speech
“can stir people to action, move them to tears of both joy and sorrow, and—
as it did here—inflict great pain. On the facts before us, we cannot react to
that pain by punishing the speaker.” 200 Instead, the Court reasoned that “[a]s
a Nation we have chosen a different course—to protect even hurtful speech
on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate.” 201
The Court has even affirmed the right to engage in offensive
commercial speech. In Matal v. Tam (2017), the Court overturned a
decision by the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) refusing to process
an application to trademark the name “The Slants” by a band made up of
Asian-American members who were trying to reclaim this offensive term. 202
The PTO’s justification was that the name violated the Lanham Act, which
prohibits trademarks that “disparage” any persons. 203 However, the Court
ruled that the band had a First Amendment right to obtain the trademark
for that name, explaining that “[g]iving offense is a viewpoint, and that
discrimination on the basis of viewpoint triggers First Amendment
scrutiny. 204 Similarly, in Iancu v. Brunetti (2019), the Court overturned a
PTO decision to deny a trademark to a clothing line called “FUCT” after
the PTO found the name violated the Lanham Act’s prohibition on
trademarks that are “immoral” or “scandalous.” 205 In finding this trademark
197

Id. at 382 (citations omitted).

Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 447–48, 461 (2011). According to the Court, the signs
used included the following: “‘God Hates the USA/Thank God for 9/11,’ ‘America is
Doomed,’ ‘Don’t Pray for the USA,’ ‘Thank God for IEDs,’ ‘Thank God for Dead Soldiers,’
‘Pope in Hell,’ ‘Priests Rape Boys,’ ‘God Hates F__s’ [letters omitted], ‘You’re Going to
Hell,’ and ‘God Hates You.’” Id. at 448.
Id. at 458.
Id. at 460–61.
Id. at 461.
Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017).
198

199
200
201
202
203
204

Id.
Id. at 1763. The Court did not determine if the PTO’s denial of trademark failed to meet

strict scrutiny because the Court determined that even under the more deferential level of
scrutiny given to government regulations of commercial speech, the denial violated the First
Amendment. Id. at 1763–64.
Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2297–98 (2019). Although Brunetti claimed that the
name of the clothing line was pronounced by spelling out the four letters as F-U-C-T, the
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denial to be unconstitutional, the Court in Iancu held that the PTO’s
decision “disfavors certain ideas,” 206 and that “[t]he government may not
discriminate against speech based on the ideas or opinions it conveys.” 207
Both Matal 208 and Iancu 209 favorably cited the public university case
Rosenberger, which explicitly stated a presumption against the
constitutionality of viewpoint discrimination: “Discrimination against
speech because of its message is presumed to be unconstitutional.” 210
Indeed, in Rosenberger, the Court specified that “[f]or the University, by
regulation, to cast disapproval on particular viewpoints of its students risks
the suppression of free speech and creative inquiry in one of the vital centers
for the Nation’s intellectual life, its college and university campuses.” 211 The
Court’s bold statement in Packingham that social media websites are now
“the most important places (in a spatial sense) for the exchange of views” 212
clarifies that traditional First Amendment rules for how public universities
must treat students apply to online expression. This means that
constitutionally protected speech punished due to viewpoint or content is
presumptively unconstitutional, 213 or requires the government to pass strict
scrutiny: “The Government may . . . regulate the content of constitutionally
protected speech in order to promote a compelling interest if it chooses the
least restrictive means to further the articulated interest.” 214 Government
regulations have long been expected typically to fail strict scrutiny. 215
This does not mean that public universities have no power to punish
any student expression on social media. Instead, universities are prohibited
Court reasoned that “you might read it differently and, if so, you would hardly be alone.” Id.
at 2297.
206
207

Id.
Id. at 2299.

Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763 (2017) (“Potentially more analogous are cases in
which a unit of government creates a limited public forum for private speech. See, e.g., . . .
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831, 115 S. Ct. 2510, 132
L.Ed.2d 700 (1995) . . . . When government creates such a forum, in either a literal or
‘metaphysical’ sense, see Rosenberger, 515 U.S., at 830, 115 S. Ct. 2510 some content- and
speaker-based restrictions may be allowed, see id., at 830–831, 115 S. Ct. 2510. However,
even in such cases, what we have termed ‘viewpoint discrimination’ is forbidden. Id., at 831,
115 S. Ct. 2510.”).
Iancu, 139 S. Ct. at 2299 (“The government may not discriminate against speech based on
the ideas or opinions it conveys. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515
U.S. 819, 829–830, 115 S. Ct. 2510, 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (1995). . .”).
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995).
Id. at 836.
Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017).
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
Sable Commc’n. of Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
See generally Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term: Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) (famously characterizing strict scrutiny as “‘strict’ in theory and fatal in
fact”).
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only from sanctioning students for protected speech online. 216 If expression
falls into one of limited number of narrow exceptions outside of First
Amendment protection, 217 public universities may take action against those
students. This is particularly the case if that expression on social media
targets individual members of the university community. 218 To take a line
from R.A.V., a public university has “sufficient means at its disposal . . .
without adding the First Amendment to the fire.” 219
For instance, public universities may impose sanctions against students
who engage in defamation on social media. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.
(1974), the Court held, “[S]tates should retain substantial latitude in their
efforts to enforce a legal remedy for defamatory falsehood injurious to the
reputation of a private individual,” “so long as they do not impose liability
without fault.” 220 Generally, that means there is no First Amendment
protection for false statements that harm someone’s reputation. 221 However,
that limitation on student free speech rights applies merely to statements
made about private persons. 222 If the expression is false speech harming the
reputation of public officials 223 or public figures, 224 then “actual malice” must
also be shown, defined in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) as
expression made “with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard
of whether it was false or not.” 225 The First Amendment requires this
because of our “profound national commitment to the principle that debate
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and . . . it
Lindsay, supra note 174, at 1510 (“Tatro’s posts on Facebook were inappropriate, in bad
taste, and most certainly offen[sive] . . . . But the posts, however offensive,
were protected speech. A hallmark of the First Amendment is that speech does not lose its
protection merely for offense and discomfiture. The standard remains that
all speech is protected unless its content falls within an exception that removes free-speech
safeguards.”).
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010) (“From 1791 to the present . . . the First
Amendment has permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas,
and has never include[d] a freedom to disregard these traditional limitations.”) (internal
quotations omitted).
See Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 574 (4th Cir. 2011) (“Given the targeted,
defamatory nature of Kowalski’s [online] speech, aimed at a fellow classmate, it created
‘actual or nascent’ substantial disorder and disruption in the school.”).
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 396.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345–47 (1974).
Catherine Hancock, Origins of the Public Figure Doctrine in First Amendment
Defamation Law, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 81, 81 (2005–2006).
See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 332–39.
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964).
See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 335–36 (“Three years after New York Times [v. Sullivan], a majority
of the Court agreed to extend the constitutional privilege to defamatory criticism of ‘public
figures.’ This extension was announced in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and its
companion, Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130, 162, 87 S. Ct. 1975, 1995, 18
L.Ed.2d 1094 (1967).”).
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280.
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may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp
attacks on government and public officials.” 226 Thus, a student’s defamatory
comment on social media about a fellow student could be more easily
punished than a similar comment about a university dean, 227 a basketball
coach, 228 or the director of a major university program. 229
Parodies, which include statements that “could not reasonably be
understood as describing actual facts about [someone] or actual events in
which [one] participated,” or that constitute humor that is “not reasonably
believable,” 230 are protected expression. In Hustler Magazine v. Falwell
(1988), the Justices found constitutional protection for a parody ad depicting
Reverend Jerry Falwell Sr. as having an incestuous relationship with his
mother while drunk in an outhouse, 231 declaring that “even though
falsehoods have little value in and of themselves, they are nevertheless
inevitable in free debate.” 232 The Court even held that false statements a
person makes about oneself receive constitutional protection in United
States v. Alvarez (2012), where the justices overturned a conviction for
falsely claiming to have won the Congressional Medal of Honor where
Alvarez was not lying to secure employment, financial benefits, or other
privileges reserved for recipients of the Medal. 233 Thus, just because a
student’s statement on social media is false, that alone does not deprive it of
First Amendment protection.
Student expression online that invades others’ privacy or that reveals
confidential information may fall outside First Amendment protection. 234 As
the Court noted in Snyder, “restricting speech on purely private matters
does not implicate the same constitutional concerns as limiting speech on
matters of public interest.” 235 However, this applies to information that is
226
227

Id. at 270.
See generally Eramo v. Rolling Stone, LLC, 209 F. Supp. 3d 862 (W.D. Va. 2016) (noting

that an associate dean of a public university was found to be a limited-purpose public figure
required to prove actual malice in a defamation lawsuit.).
See Barry v. Time, Inc., 584 F. Supp. 1110, 1118 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (recognizing one’s
“voluntary decision to become [a public university’s] head basketball coach is a sufficient
‘thrust’ within the meaning of Gertz to create limited public figure status. . . .”).
See generally Fiacco v. Sigma Alpha Epsilon Fraternity, 484 F. Supp. 2d 158 (D. Me. 2007)
(explaining that a public university’s director of judicial affairs was deemed to be a limitedpurpose public figure required to show actual malice in an intentional infliction of emotional
distress lawsuit.).
Hustler Mag. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 57 (1988) (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 48, 57.
Id. at 52 (internal quotations omitted).
See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 714–15 (2012).
See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991) (explaining the First Amendment
permits recovery of civil damages for a newspaper’s breach of a promise of confidentiality to
an informant). See also Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132–33 (1937) (explaining
under the First Amendment, there is “no special privilege to invade the rights and liberties
of others”).
Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011).
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truly private, as “the prevailing law of invasion of privacy generally
recognizes that the interests in privacy fade when the information involved
already appears on the public record.” 236
Student expression on social media that constitutes peer-on-peer
harassment would appear to be outside of First Amendment protection.
Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education (1999) indicates that liability
exists if there is “sexual harassment of students that is so severe, pervasive,
and objectively offensive, and that so undermines and detracts from the
victims’ educational experience, that the victim-students are effectively
denied equal access to an institution’s resources and opportunities.” 237 Thus,
expression that harasses members of the university community to this
degree can be punished. 238 This standard for harassment is a high one for
adults (like university students), though, and typically would have to be
ongoing, as one comment is highly unlikely to rise to this level without
corresponding conduct. 239 As explained by the Davis Court, whether
expression constitutes peer-on-peer harassment that is actionable “depends
on a constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and
relationships, including, but not limited to, the ages of the harasser and the
victim and the number of individuals involved.” 240 Furthermore, not all
sexually explicit material that a student might post online would rise to the
level of harassment, particularly if it is not directed at another person. 241
Similar to harassment, students can face sanctions from public
universities for threatening other persons, as “the First Amendment . . .
permits a State to ban a ‘true threat.’” 242 In Virginia v. Black (2003), the
Court ruled that “‘[t]rue threats’ encompass those statements where the
speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit
an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of
individuals.” 243 This includes situations “where a speaker directs a threat to
a person or group of persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of

Cox Broad Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 494–95. See also Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 762 (1985) (concluding information on a
person’s “credit report concerns no public issue”).
Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 651 (1999). While a judge on the
Court of Appeals, Justice Samuel Alito used this framework in Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch.
Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 205–11 (3d Cir. 2001). See also Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57 (1986) (giving an example of sexual harassment in the workplace).
See Brett A. Sokolow, Daniel Kast & Timothy J. Dunn, The Intersection of Free Speech
and Harassment Rules, 38 HUM. RTS. 19, 20 (2011).
See George S. Scoville III, Purged by Press Release: First Responders, Free Speech, and
Public Employment Retaliation in the Digital Age, 97 OR. L. REV. 477, 540 (2019).
Davis, 526 U.S. at 651 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Aaron H. Caplan, Free Speech and Civil Harassment Orders, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 781, 782–
83 n.3 (2013).
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003).
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bodily harm or death.” 244 Much expression that may seem threatening,
though, still receives constitutional protection, as a true threat includes only
expression where the speaker expresses intent to explicitly cause immediate
harm. 245 For instance, in Watts v. United States (1969), the Court overturned
the conviction of a Vietnam War-era draftee for saying, “I am not going. If
they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is
L.B.J.” 246 The context of this statement showed that it was merely “political
hyperbole,” which is protected by the First Amendment because “[t]he
language of the political arena . . . is often vituperative, abusive, and
inexact.” 247 Nevertheless, as the Court ruled in Black, a “speaker need not
actually intend to carry out the threat” for it to be unprotected expression,
because “a prohibition on true threats ‘protects individuals from the fear of
violence’ and ‘from the disruption that fear engenders,’ in addition to
protecting people ‘from the possibility that the threatened violence will
occur.’” 248
Inciting others to commit imminent, lawless action also falls outside of
First Amendment protection. Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969) held that “the
constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State
to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except
where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action and is likely to incite or produce such action.” 249 However, like other
unprotected categories, this one is narrowly drawn, as the Court overturned
the conviction of Brandenburg, who led a Ku Klux Klan rally where a cross
was burned, for a speech that included a racial slur, anti-Semitic rhetoric,
and advocacy of “revengeance” [sic] against the President, Congress, and
Supreme Court. 250 Thus, “the mere abstract teaching of . . . the moral
propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence, is not
the same as preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such
action.” 251 Furthermore, the Court has found protection for incitement if the
lawlessness being advocated by a speaker is not imminent. In Hess v.
Indiana (1973), while law enforcement dispersed a crowd from the street
during an anti-Vietnam War protest, Hess stated to the sheriff, “We’ll take
the fucking street later [or again].” 252 In overturning Hess’s conviction, the
Court reasoned the following: “At best . . . the statement could be taken as
counsel for present moderation; at worst, it amounted to nothing more than
244
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Steven G. Gey, A Few Questions About Cross Burning, Intimidation, and Free Speech,
80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1287, 1348 (2005).
Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 706 (1969) (internal quotation omitted).
Id. at 708.
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003) (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S.
377, 388 (1992)).
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
Id. at 445–47, 449.
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advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future time. This is not sufficient
to permit the State to punish Hess’ speech.” 253
Public universities are limited in restricting student expression beyond
these types of narrowly defined categories that fall outside of First
Amendment protection. Otherwise, banning specific types of additional
expression risks viewpoint discrimination. 254 Likewise, trying to impose bans
on speech that go beyond these narrow categories of unprotected expression
creates problems of overbreadth, 255 or such bans will fail to be specific
enough, thus creating vagueness problems that lead to a chilling effect on
expression. 256
The examples from the introduction reveal a great deal of student
speech that is protected. For instance, posting a break-up letter that was
“graded” for grammar appears protected by the First Amendment, as it
merely embarrassed—and did not threaten—the student who wrote the
letter. 257 The letter was “private,” but the communication in question was not
confidential, like a student record. 258 This perhaps explains why the
university later overturned that student’s suspension. 259 The same was true
of a student’s “satirical environmentalist collage” 260 that merely sought to call
attention to conservation concerns and embarrass the university president.
Students posting videos of a coronavirus-themed party in the early
stages of the COVID-19 pandemic (including the symbolic use of surgical
masks and biohazard symbols) may have been shocking to some, but that
alone leaves a public university no recourse to punish the views expressed
in those videos. 261 However, if the underlying non-expressive conduct
violated university policies or public health requirements, the video could
be used as evidence that eventually leads to sanctions. 262
A university blocking a student from social media accounts for
253

Id. at 108.

R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392 (1992) (stating the government “has no . . .
authority to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow
Marquis of Queensberry rules”).
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473 (2010) (“In the First Amendment context . . .
a law may be invalidated as overbroad if a substantial number of its applications are
unconstitutional.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 871–72 (1997) (“The vagueness of . . . a regulation raises
special First Amendment concerns because of its obvious chilling effect on free speech.”).
Roll, A Tweet with Consequences, supra note 5.
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referring to the university as “bastards” when criticizing the sufficiency of
library exits violates a student’s expressive rights. 263 Such action by the
university discriminates on the basis of viewpoint, or tries to punish a student
for using offensive language, either of which is unconstitutional unless the
expression was repeated serially or aimed at someone in a harassing
manner. 264
Expelling a pharmacy graduate student for posting photos with
exposed cleavage and sticking out her tongue, and for suggesting additional
lyrics for the song “WAP,” 265 also runs afoul of the First Amendment, as
sexually explicit expression cannot be deemed obscene without meeting
requirements of the Miller Test. These photos certainly would not rise to
the standard from Miller, as they clearly have artistic value. 266 The same
would be true of the medical student posting a topless photo of herself at a
nude beach in Europe, that included “#freethenipple,” as this constitutes
expression with political value, especially with the picture blurred. 267
However, as explained below, graduate or professional students who are
university employees could be subject to more restrictions on their online
expression in their capacities as employees.
Some of the examples of student social media speech in the
introduction involve more hateful speech, such as with students who
repeatedly used the N-word, 268 promoted white supremacy with a photo of
a firearm, 269 or posted that one should not vote for a candidate due to a
candidate’s sexual orientation or race. 270 These are closer cases
constitutionally, as they involve repeated postings, or the use of more hostile
imagery, or statements about other specific students. 271 As offensive and
reprehensible as the expression is in each of these examples, since it was
private student expression that did not involve ongoing harassment of
others, did not threaten specific persons, and did not incite others to engage
in imminent lawless action, the speech in each case appears to be protected
by the First Amendment. 272 This is true because a public university’s
punishment of a student for the private expression of ideas is discrimination
on the basis of viewpoint that is unconstitutional generally. 273 As explained
Cripe & Dahle, supra note 16.
Id.
Hartocollis, supra note 17.
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
McLaughlin, supra note 3.
TRIB. MEDIA WIRE, supra note 9.
Salameh & Turner, supra note 7.
Shastri, supra note 11.
See TRIB. MEDIA WIRE, supra note 9; Salameh & Turner, supra note 7; Shastri, supra
note 11.
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in Tinker, “to justify prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, [a
public educational institution] must be able to show that its action was
caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and
unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.” 274 This was
affirmed in Mahanoy, where the Court reasoned that public educational
institutions that teach young people how to engage in open dialogue with
others in a democratic society, “have a strong interest in ensuring that future
generations understand the workings in practice of the well-known
aphorism, ‘I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your
right to say it.’” 275 Put differently by the Court in Christian Legal Society v.
Martinez (2010), “a public educational institution exceeds constitutional
bounds . . . when it restrict[s] speech or association simply because it finds
the views expressed by [a] group to be abhorrent.” 276 Given Packingham, this
reasoning applies to student expression on social media. However, as
explained in Part VI below, there are constitutional actions that universities
can take to combat the very real problems of bias based on race, ethnicity,
sex, sexual orientation, religion, age, and disability.
Finally, for students there is the question of remedies when online
speech falls outside of First Amendment protection. Public universities
should be careful regarding the use of student suspension or expulsion for
expression not protected by the First Amendment as it can create a
dangerous chilling effect on student expression. 277 Even official
students or admitted students who have not yet registered for classes. See Clay Calvert,

Rescinding Admission Offers in Higher Education: The Clash Between Free Speech and
Institutional Academic Freedom When Prospective Students’ Racist Posts Are Exposed, 68
UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 282, 296 (2020) (“[N]onenrolled prospective student[s] . . .
arguably have fewer First Amendment speech rights against the actions of a public university,
. . . particularly in light of the conditional nature of [admissions] offers . . . Currently enrolled
students, in contrast, possess the full panoply of First Amendment protections. As Evan
Gertsmann recently explained, ‘[a]n admissions committee can reject a student whose
application essay contains racist tropes even if the school couldn’t expel the student for
expressing the same tropes once she is attending the school.’”). Likewise, there may be other
considerations universities have with student athlete speech—including team chemistry
concerns and that student athletes represent the university—if the sanctions are limited to
participation with the team, although a substantial amount of First Amendment protection
would apply here too. See Frank D. LoMonte, Fouling the First Amendment: Why Colleges
Can’t, and Shouldn’t, Control Student Athletes’ Speech on Social Media, 9 J. BUS. & TECH.
L. 1, 47 (2014) (“[A]n athlete attending a state institution should have considerable First
Amendment protection against content-based punishment for off-campus speech on
personal time, or against broad-based restrictions that place entire methods of
communication off-limits. State institutions will have, at the very most, the ability to regulate
and punish speech that presents the imminent risk of substantially disrupting their operations
or breaking the law.”).
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L., 141 S. Ct. 2038, 2046 (2021).
Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal. v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 683–84
(2010) (internal quotations omitted).
Kasper, supra note 119, at 572–73.
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investigations, with threats of harsh penalties that are ultimately not
imposed, can have a negative effect on the free exchange of ideas. As stated
by the Court, “First Amendment freedoms . . . are delicate and vulnerable,
as well as supremely precious in our society. The threat of sanctions may
deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of
sanctions.” 278 Certainly, there are rare situations where unprotected
expression warrants these heavy penalties, particularly if the relevant activity
violates the criminal law, but the overuse of harsh penalties for student
expression that is just over-the-line risks frightening students from engaging
in constitutionally protected expression. As an educational institution, the
university does have other means at its disposal besides punishments, and
those will be discussed in Part VI as they apply to students as well as to staff
and faculty.
IV. THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF PUBLIC UNIVERSITY
STAFF ON SOCIAL MEDIA
Like public university students, there is no question today that
substantial First Amendment free expression rights attach to public
employees, including faculty, because as explained by the Court in Rankin
v. McPherson (1987), “[v]igilance is necessary to ensure that public
employers do not use authority over employees to silence discourse, not
because it hampers public functions but simply because superiors disagree
with the content of employees’ speech.” 279 The Court in City of San Diego
v. Roe (2004) clarified that these protections are not just to foster the
personal autonomy of public employees, as they promote a public good as
well:
[P]ublic employees are often the members of the community who
are likely to have informed opinions as to the operations of their
public employers, operations which are of substantial concern to
the public. Were they not able to speak on these matters, the
community would be deprived of informed opinions on
important public issues. 280
Yet, similar to students, public university employees are subject to
reprimand for engaging in forms of expression on social media that are in
narrow categories falling outside of First Amendment protection, such as
true threats, incitement, harassment, and revealing confidential
information. 281 In addition, further narrowly defined restrictions can be
278
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placed on public employee speech, because, as the Court explained in
Garcetti v. Ceballos (2006), “[w]hen a citizen enters government service, the
citizen by necessity must accept certain limitations on his or her freedom.” 282
Early Court decisions provided no First Amendment protections for
public employees. Before the 1960s, the Court instead applied the “doctrine
of privilege” to public employees, finding that since public employment was
a privilege, significant restrictions could be imposed on such employees. 283
For instance, the Justices upheld the Hatch Act in United Public Workers
v. Mitchell (1947), which at the time prohibited federal civil servants from
being actively involved in political campaigns. 284 Instead of finding First
Amendment protections for federal employees, the Court in Mitchell
deferred to the other two branches of the federal government: “Congress
and the President are responsible for an efficient public service. If, in their
judgment, efficiency may be best obtained by prohibiting active participation
by classified employees in politics as party officers or workers, we see no
constitutional objection.” 285 In Adler v. Board of Education (1952), the
Court upheld a New York law prohibiting anyone from being a public
school employee if they taught or advocated, or was a knowing member of
an organization that taught or advocated, the overthrow of the government
by force or violence. 286 The Court in Adler dismissed the notion that the
appellants had First Amendment rights that protected them as public
employees:
It is clear that such persons have the right under our law to
assemble, speak, think and believe as they will. It is equally clear
that they have no right to work for the State in the school system
on their own terms. They may work for the school system upon
the reasonable terms laid down by the proper authorities of New
York. If they do not choose to work on such terms, they are at
liberty to retain their beliefs and associations and go elsewhere.
Has the State thus deprived them of any right to free speech or
assembly? We think not. 287
The Court’s crabbed view of public employee expressive rights in

Adler was a continuation of the doctrine of privilege expressed in Mitchell.

288

matters does not implicate the same constitutional concerns as limiting speech on matters of
public interest.”).
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006).
Toni M. Massaro, Significant Silences: Freedom of Speech in the Public Sector
Workspace, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 3, 8 (1987).
United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 103–04 (1947).
Id. at 99.
Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 496 (1952).
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In the late 1960s the Court began expanding First Amendment rights
for public employees in cases that have continuing significance today. In
Pickering v. Board of Education (1968), the Court reviewed the dismissal
of a public school teacher for writing a letter to the editor criticizing the
school district’s management of bond issue proposals and its fund
allocations between athletics and the classroom. 289 Perhaps the most pointed
statement in Pickering’s letter was when he reviewed district spending on
sports before declaring, “These things are all right, provided we have
enough money for them. To sod football fields on borrowed money and
then not be able to pay teachers’ salaries is getting the cart before the
horse.” 290 The Pickering Court announced a test for public employee
expression rights, declaring that “[t]he problem in any case is to arrive at a
balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting
upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer,
in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
employees.” 291 Accordingly, the Court held that “statements by public
officials on matters of public concern must be accorded First Amendment
protection despite the fact that the statements are directed at their nominal
superiors.” 292 The Court found Pickering’s statements were protected
expression because “the question whether a school system requires
additional funds is a matter of legitimate public concern . . . in a society that
leaves such questions to popular vote,” and “[t]eachers are, as a class, the
members of a community most likely to have informed and definite
opinions as to how funds allotted to the operation of the schools should be
spent.” 293
The Court’s approach to public employee free speech rights was
further explored in Connick v. Myers (1983), where the Justices explained
that “[speech] concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the
essence of self-government. Accordingly, the Court has frequently
reaffirmed that speech on public issues occupies the highest rung of the
hierarchy of First Amendment values, and is entitled to special
protection.” 294 The Court clarified that public employees have protection to
discuss broadly defined subject matter, as the “First Amendment does not
protect speech and assembly only to the extent it can be characterized as
political. Great secular causes, with smaller ones, are guarded.” 295 However,
the Court in Connick illuminated that short of “fixed tenure or applicable
statute or regulation, . . . [w]hen employee expression cannot be fairly
considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to
289
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the community, government officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing
their offices, without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the
First Amendment.” 296 In discerning if expression is of public concern or
purely private concern, the Court determined that it would examine “the
content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole
record.” 297 As described by the Connick Court, the Pickering balancing test
requires “full consideration of the government’s interest in the effective and
efficient fulfillment of its responsibilities to the public,” including “the
government’s legitimate purpose in ‘[promoting] efficiency and integrity in
the discharge of official duties, and [in] [maintaining] proper discipline in
the public service.’” 298 Connick developed what was a two-prong test for
examining freedom of expression claims for public employees, often
referred to as the Pickering-Connick balancing test: (1) ask if a public
employee was speaking on a matter of public concern, and (a) if it was not
a matter of public concern, then the claim will be denied, but (b) if the
speech was on matters of public concern, then (2) ask if the employee’s free
speech interests carry more weight than the employer’s reason(s) for
restricting expression. 299
The Pickering-Connick test was modified by the Court in Garcetti v.
Ceballos (2006). There, the Court narrowed the protections for public
employees, emphasizing that “[g]overnment employers, like private
employers, need a significant degree of control over their employees’ words
and actions; without it, there would be little chance for the efficient provision
of public services.” 300 Nevertheless, the Court in Garcetti affirmed that “a
State cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the
employee’s constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression,” 301
and the Court underscored “the importance of promoting the public’s
interest in receiving the well-informed views of government employees
engaging in civic discussion.” 302 Furthermore, the Court clarified that if
“employees are speaking as citizens about matters of public concern, they
must face only those speech restrictions that are necessary for their
employers to operate efficiently and effectively,” 303 and the “First
Amendment protects some expressions related to the speaker’s job.” 304
Id. at 146.
Id. at 147–48.
Id. at 150–51 (quoting Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371, 373 (1882)).
Id. at 146–50; see also Emily Gold Waldman, Returning to Hazelwood’s Core: A New
Approach to Restrictions on School-Sponsored Speech, 60 FLA. L. REV. 63, 82 (2008). If
the threshold question is answered in the negative (e.g., an employee is not speaking on a
matter of public concern), then the First Amendment claim fails. Id.
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However, the Court concluded in Garcetti that “when public employees
make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not
speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution
does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.” 305
According to the Garcetti Court, this modification to the Pickering-Connick
test was necessary because “[r]estricting speech that owes its existence to a
public employee’s professional responsibilities does not infringe any
liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen,” and
“[e]mployers have heightened interests in controlling speech made by an
employee in his or her professional capacity.” 306 In sum, if “an employee
speaks as a citizen addressing a matter of public concern, the First
Amendment requires a delicate balancing of the competing interests
surrounding the speech and its consequences,” but if “the employee is
simply performing his or her job duties, there is no warrant for a similar
degree of scrutiny.” 307 Thus, after Garcetti, for public employee expression
to be protected speech, one must be (1) speaking as a citizen (not pursuant
to official work duties), (2) on matters of public concern, and (3) the speech
must outweigh the employer’s interests in efficiency and effectiveness. 308
Although Garcetti made it slightly more difficult for public employees to
prevail on free speech claims, 309 the Court affirmed that public employee job
duties cannot be purposely fashioned to overtly limit First Amendment
rights: “We reject . . . the suggestion that employers can restrict employees’
rights by creating excessively broad job descriptions.” 310
Overall, the Pickering-Connick-Garcetti line of cases establishes that a
public employee can be disciplined consistent with the First Amendment if
one is speaking pursuant to official work duties, if one is speaking on a
matter of private concern, or if one’s speech as a citizen on a matter of public
concern is outweighed by relevant employer interests. 311 However, outside
of these situations, speech by public employees is protected by the First
Amendment. Since public employees learn information in their
employment that gives them special awareness and even wisdom that the
public may find important to know, it is imperative that what constitutes
“matters of public concern” is interpreted broadly, while official work duties
and employer interests should both be interpreted narrowly. 312 Much
Supreme Court jurisprudence reflects this understanding.
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Although speech falling into unprotected categories (e.g., obscenity,
libel, harassment, incitement, etc.) would not be speech on matters of public
concern, 313 outside of those categories, a great deal of expression would be
on matters of public concern. The most foundational Court decision on
public employee speech rights, Pickering, offered a very broad view of
protected speech for public employees, making it almost coterminous with
that of the general public: “[T]he interest of the school administration in
limiting teachers’ opportunities to contribute to public debate is not
significantly greater than its interest in limiting a similar contribution by any
member of the general public.” 314 The Court in Pickering went on to state
that “absent proof of false statements knowingly or recklessly made by him,
a teacher’s exercise of his right to speak on issues of public importance may
not furnish the basis for his dismissal from public employment.” 315 As
explained by the Court in Connick, relevant expression includes anything
that can “be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or
other concern to the community.” 316 Using this approach, the Connick
Court determined that an internal office questionnaire asking other
employees to evaluate how the office was run “concerned only internal
office matters and . . . such speech is not upon a matter of ‘public
concern.’” 317
Other Court cases confirm that “public concern” should be
understood broadly. In Madison Joint School District v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Commission (1976), the Court struck down a state
order banning teachers who were not union representatives from speaking
at an open meeting of the elected school board. 318 In a case that involved a
teacher speaking to the school board on a matter at issue in union contract
negotiations, 319 the Court reasoned that such expression was protected
because the teacher “addressed the school board not merely as one of its
employees but also as a concerned citizen, seeking to express his views on
an important decision of his government.” 320
Beyond communicating directly with governing bodies, speaking on
issues of public concern has been held to encompass speaking with other
citizens, and even co-workers, including in controversial ways. In Rankin,
See Natalie Rieland, Government Employees’ Freedom of Expression Is Limited: The
Expression Must Touch on Matters of “Public Concern” or Be Intended to Educate or
Inform the Public About the Employer to Warrant First Amendment Protection, 44 DUQ.
313
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Id. at 574.
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983).
Id. at 143.
Madison Joint School Dist. v. Wis. Emp. Rels. Comm’n, 429 U.S. 167, 169, 177 (1976).
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the Court reversed the discharge of a clerical employee in a Texas county
constable’s office for responding as follows to a co-worker upon hearing
about the attempted assassination of President Ronald Reagan: “If they go
for him again, I hope they get him.” 321 The Court in Rankin found that this
statement “plainly dealt with a matter of public concern,” when examining
the whole record, because it “was made in the course of a conversation
addressing the policies of the President’s administration” and “came on the
heels of a news bulletin regarding what is certainly a matter of heightened
public attention: an attempt on the life of the President.” 322 Importantly, the
Court reasoned that “[t]he inappropriate or controversial character of a
statement is irrelevant to the question whether it deals with a matter of public
concern.” 323
In San Diego v. Roe, the Court explained that “public concern is
something that is a subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of
general interest and of value and concern to the public at the time of
publication,” including “certain private remarks.” 324 The Court clarified that
protected speech on matters of public concern can include “when
government employees speak or write on their own time on topics unrelated
to their employment . . . absent some governmental justification ‘far stronger
than mere speculation’ in regulating it.” 325 However, applying the PickeringConnick standard, the Court in Roe found that a police officer was not
expressing himself on matters of public concern when he sold videotapes of
himself engaging in sexually explicit acts that included stripping off a police
uniform and masturbating. 326
Lane v. Franks (2014) reaffirms the principle that “public employees
do not renounce their citizenship when they accept employment, and . . .
public employers may not condition employment on the relinquishment of
constitutional rights.” 327 In Lane, the Court found truthful testimony given
under oath outside of ordinary job duties constitutes speech on matters of
public concern, even if it relates to a public employee’s job or was learned
during the course of employment. 328 Lane, an employee of the Central
Alabama Community College, uncovered evidence that another employee
engaged in financial crimes; 329 after Lane testified at that former employee’s
criminal trial, he was fired. 330 As explained by the Court in Lane, “corruption
in a public program and misuse of state funds . . . obviously involves a matter
321
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of significant public concern.” 331 The Lane Court illuminated that what
constitutes a matter of public concern remains broadly defined, including
information learned during the course of employment. 332
Conversely, Garcetti’s additional requirement, regarding public
employee expression not being protected if made pursuant to official duties,
must be understood narrowly. In both Pickering and Madison Joint School
District, speaking on matters of public concern was still protected, even
though they dealt with the “operation of the public schools in which they
work,” as it was communicated more broadly than internally at the place of
employment. 333 Garcetti clarified that writing an internal memo was part of
official duties (hence outside of First Amendment protection), while a letter
to a newspaper was outside of official duties (hence protected). 334 Even
Garcetti explained that official duties should be read narrowly and job duties
cannot be written excessively broadly, 335 meaning that most expression by
public employees will continue to be spoken as citizens, not pursuant to
official duties. 336 As described by the Garcetti Court, speech is pursuant to
official job duties only if “there is no relevant analogue to speech by citizens
who are not government employees.” 337
Lane is instructive on defining “official duties.” The Court offered that
“[s]worn testimony in judicial proceedings is a quintessential example of
speech as a citizen for a simple reason: Anyone who testifies in court bears
an obligation, to the court and society at large, to tell the truth.” 338 In
particular, since Lane involved testimony in a “public corruption scandal,” 339
the Court resolved the following: “It would be antithetical to our
jurisprudence to conclude that the very kind of speech necessary to
prosecute corruption by public officials—speech by public employees
regarding information learned through their employment—may never form
the basis for a First Amendment retaliation claim.” 340 The Lane Court placed
an emphasis on needing to protect truthful employee speech, particularly if
given under oath. 341 This suggests again that what is considered official duties
should be read narrowly, and that Garcetti’s “official duties” apply merely
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to employer work assignments to employees. 342
If a public employee is speaking on matters of public concern outside
of official duties, courts will balance speech rights against employer
interests. 343 However, it is of paramount importance to understand that
employer interests have been defined narrowly by the Court, as “the First
Amendment creates a strong presumption against punishing protected
speech even inadvertently.” 344 When balancing speech on public concern
against employer interests, “[t]he State bears a burden of justifying the
discharge on legitimate grounds.” 345 If disciplining a public employee for
expressive activity, the government “must demonstrate that the recited
harms are real, not merely conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact
alleviate these harms in a direct and material way.” 346 For employers,
“pertinent considerations [include] whether the statement impairs discipline
by superiors or harmony among co-workers, has a detrimental impact on
close working relationships for which personal loyalty and confidence are
necessary, or impedes the performance of the speaker’s duties or interferes
with the regular operation of the enterprise.” 347 Employer interests that may
outweigh employee speech rights also include “testimony [that is] false or
erroneous,” or if one “unnecessarily disclosed any sensitive, confidential, or
privileged information.” 348 Although expression that would not be protected
for anyone—such as true threats, harassment, or incitement—would clearly
meet these criteria, not a great deal else does. For example, employee
speech rights outweighed employer concerns in Rankin, which involved a
crude comment by an employee expressing hope that the president would
be killed. 349
Applying Packingham to these relevant precedents leads to the
conclusion that public university employees have a substantial amount of
First Amendment protection in their use of social media. 350 Short of online
Frank D. LoMonte, Putting the “Public” Back into Public Employment: A Roadmap for
Challenging Prior Restraints That Prohibit Government Employees from Speaking to the
News Media, 68 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 29 (2019).
David L. Hudson, Jr., Public Employees, MIDDLE TENN. STATE UNIV.: FIRST
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United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 475 (1995) (quoting Turner
Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994)).
Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388.
Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 242 (2014).
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Amendment Public Employment Protections in the Age of Social Media, 27 AM. U. J.
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expression that actually, not just conjecturally, harms co-worker
relationships, prevents one from completing duties, or involves false
testimony under oath or the disclosure of confidential or sensitive
information, expression on matters of public concern is generally protected.
The interests of a public university as employer should be specifically
understood this way, as universities are tasked with fostering the free
exchange of ideas and challenging existing orthodoxies. 351 More than other
institutions, the freedom of expression is essential to the operation of
universities because they are primarily charged with producing and
disseminating knowledge. 352 More broadly, a university’s mission includes
the pursuit of truth. 353 Thus, if the employer interests in the context of a
public university include fostering the free expression of ideas, then there is
relatively less to consider in the balancing against employee free speech
interests compared to other public employers.
Revisiting the examples from the introduction reveals expression of
public university employees is offered significant protection. The professor
who said there was blood on the hands of the National Rifle Association for
a mass shooting 354 was commenting on a matter of public concern. It was
also a comment about a national organization, not someone not affiliated
with the university, raising little relevant employer interest.
Similarly, comments by a faculty member alleging that a recently
deceased former First Lady was a racist who helped to raise a war criminal, 355
although offensive, are clearly related to matters of public concern and
about multiple public figures. The same was true of a comment by an
instructor criticizing a sitting president and wishing, hyperbolically, that
someone would assassinate him, 356 as this bore striking resemblance to the
facts in Rankin, where the expression at issue was protected. Likewise, a
professor who tweeted about how a debate moderator should respond to
condition employment on the forfeiture of individual rights. . . . The prohibition against a
government employer compelling behavior extends into the realm of social media use and
employee speech through the rejection of broad social media policies. The Supreme Court
in Packingham held that the government cannot deny access to social media platforms to
citizens based on their status as sex offenders. Although Packingham addressed a general
restriction on access to social media, the Court’s reasoning still applies to broad restrictions
on social media use and access.”).
McCauley v. Univ. of the V.I., 618 F.3d 232, 243 (3d Cir. 2010) (“The pedagogical
mission[] of public universities . . . encourages inquiry and challenging a priori assumptions
. . . The university atmosphere of speculation, experiment, and creation is essential to the
quality of higher education.”).
KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, SPEAK FREELY: WHY UNIVERSITIES MUST DEFEND FREE
SPEECH 6, 13 (2018).
DONALD ALEXANDER DOWNS, FREE SPEECH AND LIBERAL EDUCATION: A PLEA FOR
INTELLECTUAL DIVERSITY AND TOLERANCE 31 (2020).
Flaherty, Protected Tweet?, supra note 21.
Tchekmedyian, supra note 24.
Jaschik, supra note 22.
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answers from the vice president, including characterizing the vice president
as having a “little demon mouth,” 357 was speaking hyperbolically about a
public official and on a matter of public concern. A professor who used
disparaging language when complaining of white gentrification 358 was also
commenting on a matter of public concern.
Closer cases are raised, even when the comments are on matters of
public concern, if the posts could create a detrimental impact on working
relationships with students or co-workers. Such questions arise with the
example of what a university characterized as a professor’s racist, sexist, and
homophobic views. 359 However, these comments ultimately related to
discourse on matters of gender and sexuality or the structure of academia, 360
and they did not relate to any specific co-worker or student. This suggests
that these comments, as offensive as they were, deserved First Amendment
protection, something the university concluded as well. 361 The same was true
of an assistant football coach who, in the process of tweeting about a public
figure’s involvement in an election, made what were characterized as racist,
fat-shaming comments, 362 or the professor who tweeted that she hoped a
public figure suffered when he died. 363 While more egregious cases may,
depending on the entire record, rise to the level of the university offering,
or even requiring, sensitivity education or restorative conferencing, harsher
penalties (such as firing or demotion) for citizen expression on matters of
public concern run afoul of the First Amendment. If a public employee can
be protected from being fired for wishing for the assassination of a public
figure, 364 then these comments about public figures are clearly protected.
Another closer case was the professor who posted about finding a
“hitman” after a difficult day at work, and later, on a “good day,”
commenting that she did not “want to kill even one student” after previously
holding different sentiments on the matter. 365 If these were true threats,
instead of being made in jest, they clearly would not be on a matter of public
concern. Likewise, if these comments identified specific students, they
would be on matters of private concern. However, viewed in their totality,
this professor’s comments, while blowing off steam, were ultimately
inarticulate commentary on the difficulties of working in academia, a matter
of public concern. The same was true of the professor who wrote
Carter, Professor’s Tweet About Pence’s “Little Demon Mouth” Sparks Collin College
Controversy, supra note 39.
Adely, supra note 26.
Flaherty, Bigoted Views vs. Bigoted Teaching, supra note 29.
Id.
Id.
Rittenberg, Tennessee-Chattanooga Mocs Fire assistant Football Coach Chris Malone
After Racist Tweet, supra note 47.
Smith, supra note 49.
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inflammatory invective about police, “capitalists,” and politicians, 366 as that
post was speaking hyperbolically about entire professions, not making a true
threat against a specific person or imminently inciting followers to commit
acts of violence.
Context matters. Like the other examples above, if specific members
of the university community were targets of the expression, or if that
expression was occurring at work and said in person (while one is acting in
one’s capacity as a public employee) rather than online, then the expression
may no longer receive First Amendment protection. Furthermore, there
were multiple examples above of student expression on social media,
including repeatedly using racial slurs, 367 or explicitly promoting white
supremacy with the use of a firearm, 368 which could fall outside of First
Amendment protection if stated in the same way by public employees. In
other words, public employee expression—following the Pickering,
Connick, and Garcetti precedents—is protected to a slightly lower degree
than public university student expression. Again, though, context matters, as
the use of epithets or photos of firearms could be speech on matters of
public concern that do not conflict with employer interests if, for example,
epithets are being explored in the context of when it is legal to utter them
(as opposed to directing them at another person) or if a photo or video of a
firearm is exhibited for educational purposes (as opposed to threatening
another person). 369
Finally, as with students, the gravity of the punishment matters for First
Amendment rights of public employees. Even when expression is not
protected, public universities must be careful not to impose a greater penalty
than is warranted, as severe penalties risk creating a chilling effect on
expression. 370 Furthermore, the Court’s jurisprudence makes clear that even
administrative investigations raise significant First Amendment concerns:
“Speech can be chilled and punished by administrative action as much as
by judicial processes.” 371 Thus, in Part VI, like for students, ideas to promote
relevant university values outside of punitive actions will be explored.

Flaherty, University Seeks State AG’s Advice on Professor’s Facebook Post, supra note
37.
TRIB. MEDIA WIRE, supra note 9.
Salameh & Turner, supra note 7.
See, e.g., Randall Kennedy & Eugene Volokh, The New Taboo: Quoting Epithets in the
Classroom and Beyond, 49 CAP. U.L. REV. 1 (2021).
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V. THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF PUBLIC UNIVERSITY
FACULTY ON SOCIAL MEDIA
Public university faculty’s First Amendment rights have overlap with
both public university students and staff. Like students and staff, faculty can
be reprimanded for social media statements that fall outside of First
Amendment protection entirely, like true threats, incitement, and
harassment. Like other public employees, faculty statements on matters of
public concern are protected if they outbalance relevant university interests.
However, with faculty, there is another First Amendment concern to be
explored: academic freedom. This makes Garcetti’s distinction between
citizen speech and speaking pursuant to job duties inapplicable to faculty.
Historically, the Justices started finding greater First Amendment rights
for employees at public universities in the 1950s, before it began finding
those protections for public employees in other settings. 372 In Wieman v.
Updegraff (1952), the Justices struck down as arbitrary a mandatory state
loyalty oath as applied to faculty and staff at the Oklahoma Agricultural and
Mechanical College. 373 The Court’s applying constitutional rights to public
employees began slowly in Wieman, affirming that “constitutional
protection does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant to a
statute is patently arbitrary or discriminatory.” 374 Although Wieman spoke
in terms of First Amendment protections for faculty and staff at public
universities, soon thereafter the Court began emphasizing special
constitutional concerns for faculty. 375
Sweezy v. New Hampshire (1957) reviewed the case of a professor who
was found in contempt for refusing to answer questions by the state attorney
general about a lecture he gave, his involvement with the Progressive Party,
and his advocacy of socialism. 376 The Sweezy Court overturned this
contempt conviction, affirming that “the exercise of the power of
compulsory process [must] be carefully circumscribed when the
investigative process tends to impinge upon such highly sensitive areas as
freedom of speech or press, freedom of political association, and freedom
of communication of ideas, particularly in the academic community.” 377 The
Court in Sweezy likewise proclaimed that a faculty member possesses a
“right to lecture and [a] right to associate with others,” and that these are
Joseph O. Oluwole, On the Road to Garcetti: “Unpick”erring Pickering and Its Progeny,
36 CAP. U. L. REV. 967, 969 (2008).
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952).
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“constitutionally protected freedoms.” 378 Denying them to public university
faculty “was an invasion of petitioner’s liberties in the areas of academic
freedom and political expression—areas in which government should be
extremely reticent to tread.” 379 The Court then gave an impassioned defense
for constitutionally protected academic freedom:
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American
universities is almost self-evident. No one should underestimate
the vital role in a democracy that is played by those who guide
and train our youth. To impose any strait jacket upon the
intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil
the future of our Nation. No field of education is so thoroughly
comprehended by man that new discoveries cannot yet be made.
Particularly is that true in the social sciences, where few, if any,
principles are accepted as absolutes. Scholarship cannot flourish
in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers and
students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to
evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our
civilization will stagnate and die. 380
The Sweezy Court emphasized that the First Amendment protects
academic freedom for teaching faculty, as this helps prepare students for
democratic citizenship, placing academic freedom on par with political
speech. 381 Academic freedom ensures faculty can teach students about and
debate a variety of other subjects beyond politics and public policy, assisting
students in achieving new understandings of the universe. 382 This passage
likewise connects university faculty’s academic freedom to do research
outside of the classroom and make new discoveries in various fields in
pursuit to truth. 383 Anything short of strong protection of freedom to teach,
and to conduct and disseminate research, risks creating a chilling effect on
what the Court characterized as essential and vital work. Suggesting that the
alternative would be the stagnation and death of our entire society
underscores the importance of academic freedom constitutionally.
The Court reaffirmed these principles in Shelton v. Tucker (1960). 384
An Arkansas statute required public school and university educators and
administrators to annually submit an affidavit listing all organizations to
which the employee belonged. 385 Both a University of Arkansas professor
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and two Little Rock public school teachers filed suit alleging the
requirement was unconstitutional. 386 Quoting Wieman and Sweezy, the
Court found that the law violated the freedom of association, stating that the
“vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in
the community of American schools.” 387
The Court again emphasized academic freedom as an individual right
of faculty members in Baggett v. Bullitt (1964). 388 Baggett involved two
different Washington State statutes that required all state employees
(including faculty) to take loyalty oaths to the constitutions, laws, and flags
of the United States and Washington State, and the oath required each
person to swear or affirm that one was neither a Communist Party member
nor a “subversive person.” 389 The Baggett Court found the oath requirement
unconstitutionally vague under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 390
The Justices chided the state for not making it clear if, for example, it was
subversive to “attend and participate in international conventions of
mathematicians and exchange views with scholars from Communist
countries” 391 or for the editor of a scholarly journal to analyze and criticize
manuscripts of communist scholars. 392
First Amendment rights of faculty at public universities were confirmed
in strong terms in Keyishian v. Board of Regents (1967), where the Court
struck down a requirement of State University of New York faculty to sign
a certificate affirming they were not communists. 393 The Court reasserted its
bold protections of expressive and associational rights for university faculty:
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic
freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us and not
merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a
special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate
laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom. 394
As explained by the Justices, “[t]he classroom is peculiarly the
marketplace of ideas. The Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained
through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers
truth out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of
authoritative selection.” 395 According to the Court, with the law, “the stifling
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effect on the academic mind from curtailing freedom of association in such
manner is manifest.” 396 Like Sweezy, the Keyishian Court staked the
country’s very future on university faculty’s constitutional right to academic
freedom. 397
The same year as Keyishian, the Court stressed individual instructors’
rights in Whitehill v. Elkins. 398 This was another anti-subversive oath
requirement at a state university, requiring each faculty member to state in
writing that one was “not engaged in one way or another in the attempt to
overthrow the Government of the United States, or the State of Maryland,
or any political subdivision of either of them, by force or violence,” and that
falsely swearing such was subject to the penalties of perjury. 399 As in other
loyalty oath cases applied to public university faculty, the Court found this
one unconstitutional. 400 The Court noted, “We are in the First Amendment
field. The continuing surveillance which this type of law places on teachers
is hostile to academic freedom.” 401 One of the Court’s concerns in Whitehill
was overbreadth: “[W]e find an overbreadth that makes possible oppressive
or capricious application as regimes change. That very threat . . . may deter
the flowering of academic freedom as much as successive suits for
perjury.” 402
Following Pickering’s protection for public employees to critique
employers on matters of public concern, Perry v. Sindermann (1972)
clarified that public university faculty have a right to engage in this type of
criticism, even if they lack tenure. 403 Robert Sindermann was a professor of
government and social science employed via one-year contracts at Odessa
Junior College. 404 Sindermann testified before committees of the Texas
Legislature, advocating that the state convert the two-year college to a fouryear college, a change opposed by the college’s board of regents. 405
Sindermann also publicly criticized the regents. 406 The regents voted not to
offer Sindermann another teaching contract, due to what they characterized
as insubordination. 407 In finding that Sindermann had relevant constitutional
rights even though he lacked tenure, the Court cited multiple cases in other
contexts to demonstrate that “the nonrenewal of a nontenured public school
teacher’s one-year contract may not be predicated on his exercise of First
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and Fourteenth Amendment rights.” 408 Thus, if instructional faculty at a
public university can show that a teaching contract was not renewed for the
exercise of constitutionally protected expression, the instructor has a valid
claim against one’s employer. 409 This decision ensures that faculty without
official tenure at public universities have First Amendment protection in
their capacity as faculty. 410
More recent court cases dealing with admissions standards (not
university or state restrictions on individual faculty) have continued the trend
of underscoring constitutionally protected academic freedom. Consider
Regents v. Bakke (1978): “Academic freedom, though not a specifically
enumerated constitutional right, long has been viewed as a special concern
of the First Amendment.” 411 In Grutter v. Bollinger (2003), the Court
declared, “[G]iven the important purpose of public education and the
expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated with the university
environment, universities occupy a special niche in our constitutional
tradition.” 412 In Fisher v. University of Texas (2013), the Court affirmed that
the “academic mission of a university is a special concern of the First
Amendment.” 413 In Fisher v. University of Texas (2016), the Court
explained that the Constitution should not hinder universities’ pursuit of “a
reputation for academic excellence.” 414
These cases since Bakke have emphasized academic freedom as an
institutional protection for public universities. 415 Undeniably, academic
freedom protects a university’s right to hire and fire based on its educational
mission, which is why public universities may impose professional
obligations regarding official duties for faculty. 416 Expression of ideas is
protected in the classroom and in research, but responsible discourse and
conduct can—and should—be required in these formal settings. 417 Thus, cases
like Bakke, Grutter, Fisher (2013), and Fisher (2016) do not downplay
individual instructors’ right to academic freedom with regard to universities.
Instead, they elevate universities’ academic freedom in relation to state
legislatures and other governmental bodies. This institutional protection for
public universities adds to, and does not displace, individual faculty
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members’ academic freedom from cases like Sweezy and Keyishian. 418
Although the Court has not considered individual instructors’ academic
freedom and the implications for the First Amendment in recent years, the
Court has indicated it remains an important constitutional concern. In
Garcetti, a case dealing with discipline in a district attorney’s office, the
Court explained that since “[t]here is some argument that expression related
to academic scholarship or classroom instruction implicates additional
constitutional interests that are not fully accounted for by this Court’s
customary employee-speech jurisprudence,” the Justices “need not . . .
decide whether the analysis we conduct today would apply in the same
manner to a case involving speech related to scholarship or teaching.” 419
In fact, several circuit courts have either questioned the application of
Garcetti to public university faculty or have found that academic freedom
protects public university faculty’s First Amendment rights more than public
employees generally. The Fourth Circuit deduced from Garcetti that “the
clear language in that opinion . . . casts doubt on whether the Garcetti
analysis applies in the academic context of a public university.” 420 The Ninth
Circuit found that “teaching and academic writing are at the core of the
official duties of teachers and professors.” 421 This court reasoned that
carrying out academic commitments of teaching, research, and service may
require public university faculty to engage in expression on matters of public
concern outside of normal working hours: “[P]rotected academic writing is
not confined to scholarship. Much academic writing is, of course,
scholarship. But academics, in the course of their academic duties, also
write memoranda, reports, and other documents addressed to such things
as a budget, curriculum, departmental structure, and faculty hiring.” 422 Thus,
the Ninth Circuit held that “there is an exception to Garcetti for teaching
and academic writing.” 423 More directly, the Sixth Circuit explicitly refused
to apply Garcetti to a professor’s classroom expression: “Simply put,
professors at public universities retain First Amendment protections at least
when engaged in core academic functions, such as teaching and
scholarship.” 424
The Supreme Court should affirm its classic emphasis on faculty
members’ First Amendment right to academic freedom from earlier cases
like Sweezy and Keyishian. Similar to how public employees generally have
something vital to share with the public based on information they learn on
Horwitz, supra note 379, at 491 (“Bakke represents perhaps the Court’s most significant
affirmation to that date that academic freedom was not simply an individual right, but
contained a significant component of institutional autonomy for colleges and universities.”).
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 425 (2006).
Adams v. Trs. of the Univ. of N. Carolina-Wilmington, 640 F.3d 550, 561 (4th Cir. 2011).
Demers v. Austin, 746 F.3d 402, 411 (9th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 416.
Id. at 418.
Meriwether v. Hartop, 992 F.3d 492, 505 (6th Cir. 2021).
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the job and their professional opinions about their work, public university
faculty have an important role to play in informing the public about the
subjects which they teach and upon which they conduct research. 425
University faculty have a unique position in our society of challenging
conventional beliefs and bringing new insights to our understanding of the
universe, including the natural world, society, and the humanities. 426
Therefore, in addition to the more generalized protection for public
employees to speak as citizens, public university faculty need constitutional
protection to speak, including on social media, about topics that relate to
their roles as educators and scholars. To ensure that faculty can fulfill what
the Court referred to as these essential and vital roles, the topics upon which
faculty members receive protection here should be broadly defined.
Although the Pickering-Connick balancing test still applies to public
university faculty speech (even if Garcetti’s requirement of speaking as a
citizen does not), the unique societal role played by university faculty on
academic matters—matters that are clearly of public concern—means that
employer interests should be understood as rarely outbalancing academic
freedom for faculty. Indeed, academic freedom for faculty is one of the
employers’ very interests in this context.
The American Association of University Professors (“AAUP”) has
long explained the importance of academic freedom for institutions of
higher education. The AAUP issued a report titled “Declaration of
Principles on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure” in 1915,
proclaiming that academic freedom includes three elements: “freedom of
inquiry and research; freedom of teaching within the university or college;
and freedom of extramural utterance and action.” 427 According to the
Declaration, these second and third “phases” of academic freedom are
closely related but distinguishable, in that both of them are expressive in
nature but the latter one includes “the right of university teachers to express
their opinions freely outside the university or to engage in political activities
in their capacity as citizens.” 428 Much like students and other public
university employees, faculty need to retain their rights as citizens beyond
their academic freedom, so that they have rights outside of formal
educational settings to speak freely like other citizens. 429 However, faculty
must be able to express themselves on matters that relate directly to their
HENRY REICHMAN, THE FUTURE OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM 50 (2019).
See AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, 1940 STATEMENT OF
PRINCIPLES ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE WITH 1970 INTERPRETIVE COMMENTS,
http://www.aaup.org/file/1940%20Statement.pdf [https://perma.cc/97Z2-PGU4].
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, 1915 DECLARATION OF
PRINCIPLES
ON
ACADEMIC
FREEDOM
AND
ACADEMIC
TENURE,
http://www.aaup.org/NR/rdonlyres/A6520A9D-0A9A-47B3-B550C006B5B224E7/0/1915Declaration.pdf [https://perma.cc/NVH3-LJB7].
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teaching and research, even if it could be considered part of the job.
Otherwise, faculty could have their expression online about what is arguably
“work” related topics policed by their employers for their entire careers,
thus creating a significant, chilling effect on their ability to carry out their
essential constitutional function in society. Consider, for example, faculty
who engage in public service by disseminating their research findings and
other expertise to other academics and the public through their social media
posts. 430
The AAUP’s “Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and
Tenure” in 1940 clarified that academic freedom and tenure in academia
promote the public good because “[t]he common good depends upon the
free search for truth and its free expression.” 431 This included protections
for all three areas of academic freedom proclaimed in the 1915 Declaration,
including the following:
1. Teachers are entitled to full freedom in research and in the
publication of the results . . . .
2. Teachers are entitled to freedom in the classroom in
discussing their subject, but they should be careful not to
introduce into their teaching controversial matter which has no
relation to their subject . . . .
3. College and university teachers are citizens, members of a
learned profession, and officers of an educational institution.
When they speak or write as citizens, they should be free from
institutional censorship or discipline . . . . 432
These documents by the AAUP, like Sweezy and Keyishian, helped
grow the concept of academic freedom in the United States, showing that
faculty must be able to speak both as academics (regarding the topics they
teach and research) and as citizens. 433 Accordingly, under the First
Amendment, public university faculty should have broad freedom to
express themselves on social media, as it furthers the search for truth, fosters
See, e.g., Stefanie Pietkiewicz, Science and Social Media: Tweets Offer Glimpse into the
Lives of Faculty, STAN. UNIV. DEP’T OF CHEMISTRY NEWS (Oct. 25, 2018),
430

https://chemistry.stanford.edu/news/science-and-social-media-tweets-offer-glimpse-livesfaculty [https://perma.cc/X2UL-NE8A] (describing Stanford University’s professors’ activity
on Twitter).
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, 1940 STATEMENT, supra note 426,
at 14.
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(May
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democratic self-government for the next generation of citizens, and
promotes individual autonomy.
Although many of the faculty members in the examples cited above
were already speaking as citizens (outside of employee duties) on matters of
public concern, sometimes faculty express themselves on social media
about topics related to the classes they teach or the research they
undertake. 434 The Garcetti analysis should not apply to these latter situations,
given the difficulty of determining if an academic is engaged in a work duty
when speaking about their teaching or research. This is true because faculty
often have requirements that they engage in service to the public, which can
include educating the public on matters a faculty member teaches or
researches, evaluating policies where a faculty member has professional
expertise, and publishing non-scholarly writings. 435 Thus, speaking to the
general public about matters related to teaching and research cannot be a
backdoor attempt to regulate protected faculty speech.
Returning to examples from the introduction, the criminal justice
professor’s tactless tweet about the police response to the 2020 national
protests after the killing of George Floyd 436 might raise issues of academic
freedom if that professor teaches or conducts research on the topic (given
the context of the tweet, it raised more general questions about public
employee speech). Additionally, the termination of a professor who tweeted
criticism of a college’s COVID-19 reopening plan 437 raised academic
freedom questions related to how classroom activities need to be structured
(as well as public employee speech rights as they pertain to faculty
governance). Of all of these examples, the most serious concerns regarding
academic freedom (and public employee speech rights) were raised with the
professor who was fired after criticizing his university for what he
characterized as its racist approach to accepting grants on topics that relate
to what he teaches and researches. 438 All of these cases violate the First
Amendment’s requirements for public universities. If these faculty are
speaking with academic freedom on matters related to their teaching and
research, they are speaking on matters of public concern, and there are no
countervailing measures by the university—such as impeding job
performance or impairing harmony among co-workers—that would
outweigh the expressive rights of these faculty.
See, e.g., John Zittrain (@Zittrain), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/zittrain
[https://perma.cc/X3YC-ZTSK].
See, e.g., OFFICE OF PUBLIC SERVICE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, A FACULTY GUIDE
FOR RELATING PUBLIC SERVICE TO THE PROMOTION AND TENURE REVIEW PROCESS 4–5
(2000),
https://provost.illinois.edu/files/2016/08/Communication_9_Attach_3_Faculty_Guide.pdf
[https://perma.cc/78FS-QGB7]; see also Teresa A. Sullivan, Higher Education’s Role in
Ensuring Freedom of Expression as a Human Right, 55 GONZ. L. REV. 249, 250–51 (2020).
Flaherty, Saying the Wrong Thing, supra note 33.
Vasquez, supra note 42.
Middleton, supra note 45.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS: HOW TO FOSTER AN EQUITABLE, DIVERSE,
AND INCLUSIVE PUBLIC UNIVERSITY THAT EMPHASIZES
CIVILITY WHILE RESPECTING OPEN INQUIRY AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
As discussed above, there are narrow categories of expression on social
media that are not protected for students, staff, and faculty, respectively.
Public universities can, and at times should, discipline those who engage in
expression not protected by the First Amendment 439 and work with law
enforcement where such activities violate the criminal law. Likewise, public
universities can, and should, enforce professional standards for employees
working in official capacities, which is consistent with First Amendment
academic freedom afforded to public educational institutions. 440
Furthermore, administrators must adhere to obligations imposed by the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, which applies to public
universities. 441 Even in cases where speech exceeds constitutional
protections, though, public universities should tread carefully, not imposing
penalties that are so harsh that they create an undue chilling effect on
expression. 442 Public universities must also ensure that punishments or
required educational activities do not require compelled expression of
ideological messages, as that would run afoul of the First Amendment. 443
Finally, protected speech should not be subject to unnecessary investigation,
as this can create a chilling effect on expression. 444
Again, a public university has “sufficient means at its disposal” to
accomplish its goals “without adding the First Amendment to the fire.” 445
Although public universities can sanction expression on social media that is
not protected or is inconsistent with professional standards, they cannot do
so simply because they deem it offensive. They cannot punish expression
on social media that is otherwise protected by the First Amendment. Public
universities need to allow for, and help promote, intellectual growth and the
439
440
441

CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 53, at 143.
Id. at 131–32.
See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289 (1978) (holding that Title VI

applies to only certain racial classifications that violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fifth Amendment).
See Schauer, supra note 370, at 696–97 (discussing fear of uncertainty and fallibility
deterring individuals from engaging in protected speech-related activity).
See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“We think the action
of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional
limitations on their power and invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose
of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control.”); Wooley v.
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977) (“[W]here the State’s interest is to disseminate an
ideology, no matter how acceptable to some, such interest cannot outweigh an individual’s
First Amendment right to avoid becoming the courier for such message.”).
See Speech First, Inc. v. Schlissel, 939 F.3d 756, 765 (6th Cir. 2019).
R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 380, 396 (1992).
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search for truth, especially among students, but also among staff and
faculty. 446 They should also recognize that in a moment of lapsed judgment,
someone may post something they quickly regret and wish they had not said.
Someone may come to learn that they made an inappropriate statement
after listening to someone else explain their point of view on it later. On
public university campuses we should be willing to engage with speakers
with whom we disagree (not simply try to cancel them), give them the benefit
of the doubt, and have constructive conversations when possible; doing so
promotes First Amendment values by cultivating our free speech culture.
But even more to the point, what one says may contain truth, or it may be a
criticism of the university, and that expression should not be punished. As
emphasized by the Court in Healy, public universities need to protect one’s
ability “to participate in the intellectual give and take of campus debate.” 447
Nevertheless, public universities should not be idle when students,
faculty, or staff speak on social media in ways that are protected but are
offensive or inappropriate for some other reason. The Court elaborated on
this in Bakke:
It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which
is most conducive to speculation, experiment and creation. It is
an atmosphere in which there prevail “the four essential
freedoms” of a university – to determine for itself on academic
grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be
taught, and who may be admitted to study. 448
With academic freedom, public universities possess many
constitutional tools to ensure that they can promote their own values,
including those of open inquiry, civility, tolerance, equality, diversity, and
protecting members of the campus community who may be
disproportionately targeted by invective. Thus, universities can set curricula,
create classes, engage in programming, admit students, and hire faculty and
staff with these goals in mind. The establishment of departments, programs,
and programming can help raise points of view, including lifting up the
voices of historically and currently marginalized groups. 449 Furthermore, as
explained in Fisher (2013), “[t]he attainment of a diverse student body . . .
serves values beyond race alone, including enhanced classroom dialogue
and the lessening of racial isolation and stereotypes.” 450 This reasoning
extends to the hiring of more diverse staff and faculty to help promote

DOWNS, supra note 353, at 31.
Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181 (1972).
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (quoting Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
DOWNS, supra note 353, at 40–41.
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. I, 570 U.S. 297, 308 (2013).
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intellectual diversity. 451 Curricular choices can, and should, emphasize
universities’ goals of free inquiry, civil dialogue, equality, diversity, and
inclusion. 452 Since some of the most hateful and offensive expression, while
protected by the First Amendment, has a more disproportionate impact on
some members of the campus community compared to others, 453
universities should take action to combat it within the bounds of the
Constitution. Courts are to give “judicial deference” to these decisions “that
the University deems integral to its mission” because this is “an academic
judgment.” 454
Fundamentally, the purpose of a university is to educate by advancing
knowledge and fostering the search for truth. 455 The First Amendment
assumes this and permits great reach by public universities in furtherance of
this goal, while also safeguarding individual freedom of speech. In addition
to required coursework, students, staff, and faculty can be provided with
educational activities, including those that relate to encouraging civility and
respect and to promoting equality, diversity, and inclusion; this can be either
for everyone as a part of new orientation or ongoing continuing education,
or it could be in specific cases in response to social media incidents involving
unprotected speech. These educational opportunities should do more than
train, as they can better promote free inquiry by instead challenging
assumptions, teaching one how to think (as opposed to teaching one what
to think), and acting to transform thinking about complex matters. 456 A
specific response could be required if it is a remedy for unprotected
expression, and it could be an optional educational opportunity presented
for one who engages in offensive but protected expression. 457 Restorative
Horwitz, supra note 383, at 535. See also Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 (emphasizing a
university’s authority to “to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach”).
See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 (emphasizing a university’s authority to decide “what may be
taught” and “how it shall be taught”).
See MARI J. MATSUDA, CHARLES R. LAWRENCE III, RICHARD DELGADO & KIMBERLÉ
WILLIAMS CRENSHAW, WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE
SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 7–15 (1993) (explaining how hate speech can cause
psychological and other harms to people targeted by it, stifle the free exchange of ideas, and
be associated with violence).
Fisher, 570 U.S. at 310.
WHITTINGTON, supra note 352, at 39.
See Amna Khalid & Jeffrey Aaron Snyder, Don’t Mistake Training for Education, INSIDE
HIGHER ED. (Apr. 29, 2021), https://www.insidehighered.com/views/2021/04/29/collegesshould-focus-education-more-training-about-dei-issues-opinion [https://perma.cc/SQW2LVWT] (“Training has its uses. It can even save lives. [Such as with CPR training.] But
training is woefully inadequate when it comes to confronting social problems such as poverty,
discrimination and racism. These are long-standing, knotty and complex issues that defy
ready-made solutions. Any serious effort to address them must start with education, a process
for which there are no shortcuts.”).
See, e.g., Rittenberg, Tennessee-Chattanooga Mocs Fire Assistant Football Coach Chris
Malone After Racist Tweet, supra note 47 (describing how a school employee lost his job
after issuing a racist tweet).
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justice practices could likewise be used—either mandated for unprotected
expression or presented as an educational option for offensive but protected
speech. Thus, instead of trying to expel students or fire staff and faculty, a
public university can respond by providing more educational experiences
that improve the university community and its members. Even more
proactively, universities can ensure resources for groups that are most likely
to be targeted by offensive expression, especially expression based on race,
sex, sexual orientation, religion, age, disability, and other immutable
characteristics. This can be done most notably by teaching students, faculty,
and staff about their own First Amendment rights and how to use them
effectively to engage in debate, respond to offensive expression, and call for
policy change. In this vein, administrators—as well as faculty, other staff, and
students—can use their freedom of expression to speak out against offensive
expression and educate the larger community. Those who are free speech
advocates should be especially forthright in using their own freedom of
speech to denounce hateful expression. 458 They can also use their own
expressive associational rights to decide not to associate privately with
persons who use offensive speech or communicate abhorrent ideas, or they
can engage in discourse with those posting such messages on social media,
explaining why they think it is inappropriate or wrong. Indeed, members of
the university community can employ their First Amendment rights to civilly
promote equality, diversity, and inclusivity while encouraging free inquiry.
Of course, part of the reason why universities must strictly adhere to
the requirements of the First Amendment is to avoid viewpoint
discrimination in expression made in one’s capacity as a private citizen. Not
all expression on social media investigated and punished by public
universities has been uncivil, racist, sexist, or anti-LGBTQ speech. As
examples in Part I demonstrate, some expression sanctioned by universities
includes online critiques in favor of equality, criticizing public universities
for not doing enough to promote equality, 459 and others were critical of
universities for not doing enough to protect the health and safety of the
campus community. 460 These examples demonstrate the danger of thinking
a university should have the power to censor the expression of ideas,
particularly on matters of public affairs that are critical of the functioning of
the university. This viewpoint neutral principle protecting hateful speech
ensures that students, staff, and faculty who use social media to organize a
pro-equality, anti-racist, social justice rally on campus—or use social media
to express their ideas about such topics—cannot be punished by
administrators or boards of governors who disapprove. It protects persons
SUZANNE NOSSEL, DARE TO SPEAK: DEFENDING FREE SPEECH FOR ALL 52 (2020).
See Middleton, supra note 45 (describing how a professor was fired after calling out his
university for what he characterized as racist and catering to “racist donors”).
See Cripe & Dahle, supra note 16 (blocking a student from campus social media accounts
after criticizing a lack of exits at the campus library); Vasquez, supra note 42 (firing a faculty
member after criticizing the campus’ reopening plan during the COVID-19 pandemic).
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espousing progressive views or conservative views; it guarantees members of
a majority religion, members of minority religions, agnostics, and atheists
the freedom to speak their minds. Vigorous protection of the freedom of
speech was key to the success of the civil rights movement of the 1950s and
1960s, 461 and it ensures that advocacy in support of social movements of all
types on campus is protected by the First Amendment today. Public
universities should not view the First Amendment as a straitjacket, but
instead as a form of empowerment for the university and for members of
the university community to communicate their own messages.
As reasoned by the Court in Alvarez, the First Amendment assumes
that the normal solution for expression one finds disagreeable is counterspeech: “The remedy for speech that is false is speech that is true. This is
the ordinary course in a free society. The response to the unreasoned is the
rational; to the uninformed, the enlightened; to the straight-out lie, the
simple truth.” 462 Even more to the point, the Court in Cohen proclaimed the
following:
To many, the immediate consequence of this freedom may often
appear to be only verbal tumult, discord, and even offensive
utterance. These are, however, within established limits, in truth
necessary side effects of the broader enduring values which the
process of open debate permits us to achieve. That the air may at
times seem filled with verbal cacophony is, in this sense not a sign
of weakness but of strength. 463
Particularly at a public university, the protection of different points of
view and fostering the expression of them is of paramount importance.
Public universities can adhere to the freedom of expression while also
meeting their other goals. The First Amendment requires nothing less.
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